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In truth, O Listeners, this is the most close-linked chain of events—from
the conviction of desiring to help human society is born duty, from
repeated duty is created the reputation of virtue, from that reputation of
virtue the praise of the good follows, from the praise of the good men by
necessity the power of leadership emerges, then honors, riches, and fol-
lowers.
Vico, On Humanistic Education (Oration IV), p. 102.
When Maandeeq went into labor
Twins the day she gave birth and
the two flags became one,
When we again gave thanks to Allah
And assembled the two parliaments into one,
When they were elected into Presidents and Ministers and
with healthy mind all faced the same direction
The pernicious politicians caused confusion and
Kept all privileges to themselves
If only they had led us competently, we wouldn’t have
come out empty-handed
Those merciless ones did not even knit a garment for the land
“Never lose an election,” they who made it their sole conviction,
In our rural areas they handed a killing knife to everyone
They repeatedly made false wail of no succor and without kin support
The catastrophe they created divided one household from another
The poison they have injected in us has destroyed reciprocity among the 
youth,
Their aim was always the car and the house





A specter is haunting the Somali people: It is the debilitating absence
of leadership fit to meet the complex vicissitudes of national reconsti-
tution.1 Whether in the macropolitical despair of the whole country or
in the imperatives of molecular and local needs tied to the collective
interest, the terrain of Somali politics is filled with petty and
“wannabe” politicians but totally bereft of statesmen. To engage this
critical yet unexamined issue presupposes, however, an encounter
with two larger and prior notions — that is, with development and the
state.
A. Development and the State
Like all pivotal ideas, development is the subject of long, contentious,
and continuing debates. In fact, no concept has so dominated the acad-
emic discussion and the practical arrangements of political, economic,
and social life in almost all societies. To be sure, the concentrated atten-
tion has been on those countries with a higher deficit of collective
power — a deficit most manifest in acute institutional brittleness,
accompanied by enormous social vulnerabilities. Development, then,
is a fluid process of the historical transformation of the basic structures
of a society. No nation, no matter how successful in its attempts, can
fully and forever defy the social equivalent of the Second Law of Ther-
modynamics — that is, the historically built-in contradictions that
relentlessly bring with them varieties of entropy and unintended but
negative consequences. In this sense, development, both in the inten-
sity of human exertion and the perpetuity of the task, is akin to the
labor of Sisyphus. Condemned, as all are, to such an eternal project,
there is no doubt that those with the least intellectual, political, eco-
nomic, and social provisions find it most strenuous. Moreover, their
vulnerability is compounded by the peculiarities and weight of their
inherited history, and the nature of the matrix of prevailing structures
of world order. Nonetheless, opportunities, small and big, are never
totally absent. A key ingredient in identifying and taking advantage of
these possibilities is the state.
We have dealt with the concept of the state in many of our earlier
writings.2 Here, we only aim to suggest a quick definition and then to
register a few of the fundamental points of why we believe that the
state is a decisive agent in the communal journey of development. To
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be construed as a broad authority with a monopoly of force, the state
comprises a dense hub of habits, procedures, and institutions that
accommodate individual or group interest and, most significantly,
look after national or collective well-being. Expressed differently, the
state is both an idea and a concrete phenomenon with geographical,
economic, military, social, and cultural components. Its elemental
function is not only to address diverse and standing partisan interests
but, in commanding instances, to fashion out of them a national polity
and development agenda. In the latter sense, the state is a combination
of ethical and functional imperatives. Since the idea of the state
includes the imagination of a collective identity and value that
extends, if not transcends, immediate or parochial affinities, an
embrace of the distant Other presumes an enlargement of selfhood.
The optimum point of such an inclusion is the feeling of national
belonging that, in extreme conditions, drives individuals to sacrifice
their own lives for the common good. Envisioned in this way, the state
is, in Frantz Fanon’s thinking, “The warming, light-giving center
where [woman] man and citizen develop and enrich their experiences
in wider and still wider fields . . . ”3 Functionally, four specific but cru-
cial items—items that if accomplished are bound to valorize the mutu-
ality represented by the state — present themselves forthwith:
establishment of general security and law; investment in basic services
and infrastructure; protection of the weak and the environment; and
promotion of a transparent policy framework, including reliable
macroeconomic decisions. We have, in other works, offered a spec-
trum of five state types, depending upon their degrees of success and
failure.4 In this formulation, none of the conditions are eternal; the
escalator of experience is in constant motion in both directions.
If the “great ascent,” as Paul Baran called the challenge of develop-
ment,5 is eminently contingent upon the capability, effectiveness, and
hence legitimacy of the state, we propose that such a phenomenon is
unthinkable without a particular kind of leadership.
B. Leadership
An anatomy of the state yields four concatenated frames, viz.: leader,
regime, administrative apparatus, and collective consciousness. While
we have argued, and still insist, that collective belonging is at once the
most precarious and most difficult to create, we have, nonetheless,
become increasingly cognizant of the optimum necessity of leadership
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in the making and sustenance of a viable state. Indeed, such might be
more the case in a transitional context, when revival of a civic spirit
and national mobilization are a sine qua non for renewal.
In the quadruple death of the Somali state, where each of the frames
is no more, we suggest that political leadership is where current his-
tory-making is most jammed. Two facts underscore such a judgment.
First, a deteriorating quality of leadership, accelerated by unvarnished
personal and militaristic dictatorship, directly contributed to the
demise of civic life and autonomous national institutions. Second, the
present interregnum, both in its regional and national guises, registers
either a recycling of spent out yet still ambitious failures or throws up
relative newcomers hungry for power but Lilliputian in the attributes
that count: competence, integrity, and promise. If the times are hostage
to these two categories of aspirants, the following question arises: how
can those Somalis genuinely committed to recharging the positive
movement of national history distinguish between the fake and the
genuine article—that is, separate the mere politician from the states-
man/woman?
We start with this conviction: All statesmen/women are politicians, but
all politicians are NOT statesmen/women. The politician, though capable
of occasional acts of collective value, is primarily energized by myopic
self-interest, at times instrumentally linked to the promotion of a sec-
tarian group project, and, in the end, satisfied and even exhausted by
playing the game of fortuna to collect the personal spoils it delivers to
the victors. While a politician could possibly repent and transmute
him/herself, a statesman/woman defines him/herself as quintessen-
tially a trustee. More concretely, we think there are, among others, four
additional organic characteristics that separate the latter from the for-
mer.
• Self-confidence
Different from concentrated egocentricity, this trait is a fusion of
healthy but rigorous self-minding to improve one’s life chances, and
an early awareness of civic obligations. As one moves into large are-
nas, preoccupation with inclusive well-being begins to dominate
priorities.
• Strong Moral Code
While there are, probably, precognitive sentiments of goodwill to
others that are the bequest of primary socializing agents such as the
family, the potential statesman/woman sculpts his/her own iden-
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tity by cultivating a deep sense of righteousness. Here, necessary
properties include wakefulness, probity and duty, respect for the
rights of others, overall emotional intelligence, and a strict adher-
ence to the constitution of the land.
• Vision
The rudiments of an appealing, if not moving, conception of the
task at hand requires a cluster of abilities. These include an evolving
knowledge of the relevant past; thoughtful engagement with the
perplexities of the age; an eye for a possible future, or a workable
utopia that identifies hope within the hard contradictions worth
striving for; and a modicum of public eloquence to inspire others to
embrace the vision.
• Competent Management
A statesman/woman need not be a micro-manager. Rather, leader-
ship of this kind requires a supervising attention that recruits delib-
erative competence, efficiency, and technical expertise.
Furthermore, a normalization of such criteria for appointment and
appropriate promotion, together with the example set by the leader,
would motivate the personnel to take ownership of their responsi-
bilities. In turn, this Weberian administrative rationality boosts the
currency of the leader, too. Together, they deepen the legitimacy of
the state, which bodes well for the building of effective national
authority.
It is difficult to logically explain the prevailing Somali condition
without coming to terms with the political, economic, and cultural
developments of the last century and their consequences. Barring such
considerations, it is inconceivable to treat this puzzling question: how
did this society, traditionally known for non-despotic political order and self-
reliance at the community level, produce scheming localists, warlords, and
self-indulgent faction leaders as dominant national actors? The insistence of
these individuals on personal rule, a winner-take-all political game,
and lack of accountability, contrasts sharply with an earlier era in
Somali history—a time, now expunged from collective memory, when
many aspirants were cognizant of the onerous responsibilities of lead-
ership. In this regard, it is instructive to revisit the formation of Soma-
lia’s first internal self-government in 1956. At that time, the victorious
Somali Youth League (SYL) elected the late Abdillahi Issa Mohamoud
and Aden Abdillah Osman as Prime Minister and President of the Leg-
islative Assembly, respectively. When Abdillahi Issa approached
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members of the Assembly and offered them ministerial posts, nearly
everyone declined. Each retorted that the appointment required a skill
level well beyond the nominee’s capability, and he did not want to
shame himself. Aden A. Osman, Abdillahi Issa, and several key mem-
bers of the SYL met and exerted pressure on the reluctant to step up to
the new responsibilities. After a month of appeals, Sh. Ali Jimaaleh,
Mohamoud Abdi Noor (Juujeh), Haji Musa Boqor, Mohamed Mah-
moud Farah (Maalinguur), Noor Hashi, Haji Omer Ali, and a few oth-
ers accepted their assignments. This episode marked three major
benchmarks in Somali political history. First, it signaled the beginning
of the end of the colonial era as these Somalis stepped into key posi-
tions of state power. Second, and Somalis have yet to appreciate the
significance of such a milestone, those appointed were ill equipped in
terms of having political or professional experience. Although perhaps
unintended initially, this set very low professional standards for min-
isterial posts, a terrible precedent that continues to bedevil Somali
leadership. Third, the public also had no way of assessing the unquali-
fied, who, later, swamped the political process and manipulated the
population for their particularistic utilities. To be sure, this fateful
affair could not be blamed on Abdillahi Issa, for he selected from the
best Somalis available; nonetheless, his choices set a political trajectory
that has been impossible to alter or reverse. To a great extent, the Ital-
ian colonial authority that governed Southern Somalia for the previous
seventy years bears the bulk of responsibility for the poverty of Soma-
lia’s modern political leadership and an even more illiterate public.
This article charts Somalia’s most decisive political conflict in mod-
ern times: the struggle for democratic governance and professional,
competent public institutions. The 1967 presidential election undoubt-
edly put into sharp relief the contours of the saga — at once a determi-
nant and a symbolic event in the annals of postcolonial Somali history.
That election was the first and only national occasion in which leader-
ship, democracy, and the autonomy of public service were at the center
of the contest. A handful of older Somalis know some aspects of this
story, but the rest of the citizenry are virtually ignorant of this momen-
tous affair. The narrative that follows, then, has three principal objec-
tives. First, we aim to educate the Somali public about a crucial chapter
in their history that may cast light on the current and vexatious con-
juncture. Second, we argue that two of the key actors in the drama,
President Aden A. Osman and Premier Abdirazak H. Hussein, were
examples, albeit little known, of Africa’s first genuine modern democ-
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rats, underscoring the importance of leadership in the calculus of the
construction of a viable national governance. Finally, the narrative
transmutes this piece of oral history into a written record.
Our central proposition reinforces a general perspective that
informs all our works. It is this: the character, habits, and culture of the
urban elite, contrary to conventional wisdom that sees the “clan” struc-
ture as an eternal system of communal polarization, have been, among
other factors, the forces most responsible for the poisonous degenera-
tion of political and communal relations. Consequently, the absence of
a critical mass of visionary, organized, and competent cadre to pro-
mote and stand up for institution-building and, therefore, defend civic
and national imperatives strengthens the resolve of sectarian politi-
cians. Many commentators on postcolonial Somali politics are in agree-
ment that the Aden/Abdirazak leadership, though short-lived, was
different to the extent that it mounted a bold and sustained effort to
create professional public institutions and an order that could contain
the elite’s divisive predispositions as well as maintain democracy. We
think that this is a story that must be told in numerous guises, for it
flies in the face of widely circulated but false perceptions of the Somali
people, and, rightfully, recalibrates attention upon the pivotal question
of leadership. This essay is an introductory note to a work-in-progress
that deals with the foundational contributions of President Aden in the
inception of Somali democratic practice between 1950 and 1967, and
Premier Abdirazak’s efforts to build public institutions that would sus-
tain Somalia’s democratic endowment and ensure the rule of law. We
are in the midst of extensive fieldwork pertaining to Aden’s life and work, and,
therefore, this essay will only touch upon some key elements of his legacy (the
thick details will come in the book). Our work with Abdirazak is more
advanced and thus we will devote much space here to narrate his life and con-
tributions.
We think the two men complemented each other in exactly the ways
that the constitution intended. The President provided the anchor and
strategic guidance to keep a focus on the national interest by nominat-
ing premiers who served the spirit of the constitution. Aden was an
exemplary founding statesman who was misunderstood by sectarian
politicians. The general public never had a chance to appreciate his
extraordinary leadership qualities until many years after he left office.
His stature grows with the passage of time and most of today’s genera-
tion find it incomprehensible that Somali leaders of such high caliber
existed in recent history. Hence, our belief that some memories, if
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properly retrieved, have the potential to capacitate, inspirationally, the
hard search for a Somali political community. Part Two deals with
Abdirazak’s formative years in politics, starting during World War II
until the late 1950s. Part Three narrates his emergence as a key figure
in the Somali National League in the South and decolonization. The
fourth section is an account of his role in the politics of the First Repub-
lic. Part Five focuses on the critical years after President Aden nomi-
nated him to premiership. Abdirazak’s appointment, to say the least,
was a political earthquake, as everyone thought that the President
would reaffirm the popular Prime Minister, Abdirashid Ali Shar-
marke. Section Six captures the main dynamics of the 1967 presidential
election that brought a brief but progressive moment of modern
Somali public life to a foreboding end. We conclude with a reminder of
the meaning of that history. Methodologically, then, our essay adopts a
strategy that combines external or public accounts of the past, and
reflections on the interior motion and sentiments of one, albeit impor-
tant, life—all brought forth to engage the dead-end present.
II. Initiation: From World War II through Trusteeship6
Abdirazak H. Hussein left rural Garowe shortly after his father died
and went to Galkayo where one of his sisters, who was married to one
Haji Ali Mirreh, resided. Already having spent some time in Quranic
school under the watchful eye of his religious father, he introduced
himself to Sheikh Mahmoud Yusuf, a distant relative of his father, who
owned a madrasa. The Sheikh urged him to immediately join the
madrasa. Shortly thereafter, Abdirazak moved to his sister’s house. One
of the teachers who had a lot of influence on the students was Sh.
Mohamed Issa. He often lectured about the failure of Moslem societies
to keep up with other advancing societies and posed the question: “Li
madha ta’akhara al-Muslimun wa taqadama ghayruhyma?” (Why are the
Moslems backward while their cohort civilizations have progressed?)
Naturally, the representatives of the Italian colonial state suspected
that the madrasa was a hotbed of new Islamic thinking. Abdirazak
stayed in the madrasa for about three years, where he was promoted
several times. He was thirteen years of age.
One day, Abdirazak and his younger brother, who was attending
the same madrasa, met a truck driver from Mogadishu. The driver
inquired of Abdirazak’s younger brother if he had a brother called
Sunweyne (Big Nose). Neither of the two boys knew their older
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brother’s nickname. Then the driver asked if they had a brother in
Mogadishu. When they said yes, he offered to take them to the big
town. They accepted the offer. However, because they did not want
their relatives and teachers to know they were leaving, they told the
driver that they would meet him on the main road several miles out of
town. The trip took three days and Mr. Dashow, the driver, who pro-
vided for them during the journey, dropped them off in the area of
Mogadishu called Afar-irdood (Four Gates). It was late afternoon and
the boys did not know how to find their brother. They slept in the
street for the first night. Late next morning, they discovered that their
brother was no longer in Mogadishu. Earlier, the Italians had comman-
deered most private trucks to carry supplies for their troops in the
Ethiopian campaign. Abdirazak’s brother was one of those drivers
drafted; he was already in Nagele. The year was 1939.
Another distant relative, Hassan Lugay, who was employed as a
shopkeeper in the neighborhood where the two brothers slept, discov-
ered them on his way to the mosque. He took them to a restaurant to
have breakfast. Later, Hassan Lugay introduced them to another rela-
tive (Jama Ahmed Gurrey) who owned a butcher shop. Within a few
days, Abdirazak’s younger brother got a job in a major store owned by
an Italian Jew. It catered to the large Italian population that had
recently moved to Somalia as a result of the war. Abdirazak decided to
study Italian and enrolled in the school for the natives, Scuola ele-
mentare per nativi. This was at the height of Italian fascism and segrega-
tion was the norm. Most of the teachers in the native school were nuns
who taught Italian language, Italian fascist history, and arithmetic. The
school was designed to train clerks and interpreters. Two years later,
both the Italian and the native school were closed as all resources were
mobilized for the war front. During his time in school, Abdirazak also
worked in a new shop established by his brother-in-law. But imports
dried up and, consequently, most shops in town went out of business.
Abdirazak was drafted into the Italian army, only to be released due to
his age. He requested an official letter of release that protected him
from further drafts. Soon thereafter, Italy was defeated and the British
took over all of Somalia and Ethiopia. Abdirazak and two brothers
pooled their savings and bought an old truck from one of their rela-
tives. They loaded it with sugar and left for Nagele, Somali Ethiopia.
After some mechanical difficulties on the way, they finally made it to
Nagele and sold the cargo. There they finally met their older brother,
Sunweyne, who at this time also had his own truck. Abdirazak and his
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brothers bought another cargo and took it to Adola where gold mining
was taking place. Here, he fell victim to malaria and remained sick for
a while. On their return from Adola, they met a British South African
military contingent, which commandeered their truck. They were
given a letter to take to Commissioner Captain Thomas, nicknamed
Gar Badiil (Big Beard), who later became commissioner in Mogadishu
and permitted the establishment of SYL. Abdirazak’s brother delivered
the letter to the Commissioner expecting compensation, only to be told
that the coffers of the government were empty. Still weak from
malaria, Abdirazak had to find his way back to Mogadishu. With little
money, he begged for a ride from Luuq to Mogadishu and was fortu-
nate to hitch a ride with one of the trucks owned by the Arab merchant
called Beihani. In Mogadishu, he stayed at a relative’s house. A Somali
male nurse, who used to borrow money from Abdirazak when he was
a shopkeeper, found out about the malaria. The man lived in Wardhi-
igleh and Abdirazak stayed in Iskuraran. The nurse was kind enough
to walk the distance in the mornings and treat Abdirazak, who felt bet-
ter after several injections and never had malaria symptoms again.
Several days later, Abdirazak wrote a job application to the British
Headquarters in Mogadishu. The chief administrator was one Becking-
ham. He was a General and had two Colonels, Daniel and Morgan,
working under him. Daniel had an attractive Italian woman secretary.
The woman and her brother came from Eritrea after Britain had taken
over that territory. The Italians from Eritrea, who also spoke English,
were needed by the British administration in Somalia. Someone gave
Abdirazak Italian shorts to wear when he took his application to the
office. The beauty of the woman stunned him, as she instructed him in
Italian to take the application to the personnel officer and then to
report back the reaction. The personnel officer told him to come some-
time later. Abdirazak returned many times, and on each occasion the
response was the same — nothing. On one of these visits, the secretary
took his application and told him to stop by the next day. Next morn-
ing, she informed him that his application was approved and that he
would work for her as an office boy. This was late in 1942. His job was
to deliver messages and clean the office. The secretary soon appreci-
ated Abdirazak’s diligence and work ethic. The office where he
worked was in the Government Center—Officio del Governo—a build-
ing that would become his office as the country’s Prime Minister
twenty-two years later, adjacent to Mogadishu’s best hotel, the South-
ern Cross. The secretary had a taste for café latté and her boss loved cap-
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pucino. It was one of Abdirazak’s tasks to bring these drinks to the
office from the hotel. They often gave him 20 shillings to deliver the
coffee and let him keep the change (close to 15 shillings, which was a
lot of money for him). This generosity was in part because they wanted
his silence about witnessing their lovemaking in the office. Abdirazak
earned more from these tips than his salary and in a short time he felt
well off by local standards. Seven months later, Colonel Daniel was
posted as governor of Upper Jubba. He took Abdirazak with him but
was later transferred to Nairobi. Abdirazak returned to Mogadishu
and the secretary told him that she was going with Daniel. Daniel
asked what he could do for him and Abdirazak responded that he
needed employment. Daniel wrote a letter to the Signal Squadron,
which offered him a job. Abdirazak had to go through full military
training that lasted for six months to qualify. Five of his classmates
passed the graduating examination with Abdirazak having the best
grades. Of these five men, three were of Yemeni descent and two were
Somali. This was the second class to graduate from the training school.
Ahmed Shire Egal (Lawaaha), who later became Abdirazak’s chief of
cabinet, was in the first class. Training in the school was conducted in
English, and the key to success in the Signal Squadron was the ability
to write speedily while receiving messages. The five graduates were
promoted to First Private, and then each one was transferred to a dif-
ferent region of the country to work under a supervisor. Abdirazak
was posted to Beled Weyn, where Lawaaha was stationed, and his
assignment was to maintain the station’s electrical battery and equip-
ment. Shortly thereafter, he was posted to Wardeer in Somali Ethiopia,
then under the British. In late 1944, Abdirazak was given full responsi-
bility for the station, without a supervisor. Hashi Weyreh was his
assistant. He then served in Boqol Manyo, 300 miles from Nagele.
There was a lot of trouble in the area near Boqol Manyo as Somalis
(called governo Jegaheer) disbanded from the Italian army (with their
rifles) and roamed the countryside robbing pastoralists on their way
home to Somalia. The British sent a military expedition headed by a
Captain Thomas. Abdirazak, together with his subordinate and the
radio equipment, traveled with the Captain. The expedition lasted for
three months and then they moved on to Dolo. This was 1945.
A little later, Abdirazak was transferred to Qalaafo on the Shabeelle
river. It was here that his nationalist politics got its first spark. The
region around Qalaafo was also plagued by remnants of Jegaheer, who
had already killed a British lieutenant. In retaliation, the colonial
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British meted out punishments that the local people felt to be exces-
sive. Bespectacled Captain Fitzpatrick (Somalis called him afar indood)
commanded the district. He was an Irishman who, during his tenure in
Galkayo, had already established a reputation for racist arrogance and
harsh rule. Abdirazak reported to his station and Fitzpatrick. The
Commander’s first question was “who are you?” Abdirazak
responded, “I am a Somali.” Unsatisfied by the answer, Fitzpatrick
inquired about his birthplace, to which Abdirazak replied Galkayo.
Fitzpatrick smiled and then added that he was unlucky to be from
Galkayo and to work under him. Abdirazak retorted that they would
have no problem since he intended to do his work. Fitzpatrick
expressed doubt since, in his experience, Somalis from Galkayo were
hardheaded.
Soon, Fitzpatrick and his staff, including Abdirazak, went on two
expeditions. The consequences were twofold: the rounding up of a
large number of camels, and an order from Fitzpatrick to stop the pay-
ment of salaries to many chiefs whose communities were suspected of
involvement in unlawful activities. Since former governor Colinwood
had already punished these communities for the killing of the British
officer, Abdirazak was upset by what he deemed an unlimited abuse
of colonial authority. Thereafter, he decided to write to Headquarters.
He dictated a letter, in Arabic, to his visiting younger brother in order
for the authorities not to detect his handwriting. Two copies of the let-
ter were produced, one of which was sent to Mogadishu. Three days
later, Abdirazak left the second copy on Fitzpatrick’s desk. When the
Captain found the letter, he called his Arabic interpreter to his office.
The two went for a drive for a good part of the day. At that time, Abdi-
razak was not asked about the incident, but the atmosphere in the
camp became more tense. For Abdirazak, though, this was his first
nationalist moment.7
Shortly after, Fitzpatrick promulgated a new rule in the office. He
instructed his staff to take their shoes off when they approached his
desk, which was on a platform. Soon after this rule was made, Fitz-
patrick called for one of the Illaalo (rural police), named Ardoon
Abdilleh. Ardoon rushed in without thinking about the “shoes off”
rule. Fitzpatrick growled in Kiswahili and reprimanded him for break-
ing the new instructions. He then kicked Ardoon, who did not react to
this humiliation. Word quickly spread in Qalaafo regarding the event.
Abdirazak was upset at Ardoon and wondered how a Somali man
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could accept such degrading treatment from a colonialist. This was his
second nationalist experience.
The behavior of the supervisor sufficiently infuriated Abdirazak
that he decided to challenge the rule. Rather than ask his junior col-
leagues to take messages to the commander, as was customary, Abdi-
razak decided to assume such a task himself. Once Fitzpatrick settled
into his chair, Abdirazak took the morning mail to him without taking
his shoes off. The Captain’s reaction was predictable. He demanded to
know why Abdirazak entered the office with shoes and broke the rule.
When Abdirazak replied, in Italian, that no such government regula-
tion existed, Fitzpatrick asked if he was deliberately defying his supe-
rior’s instruction. Abdirazak responded that all government
regulations were printed and he had no intention of disobeying legiti-
mate orders. Fitzpatrick became more furious, left his chair, and
punched his subordinate in the face. Abdirazak fought back and out-
maneuvered him as the two fell and wrestled on the floor. Fitzpatrick
called for help and Ardoon came running. He was ordered to take
Abdirazak to the jailhouse, run by one Mohamoud Mireh, who later
became a member of Siyaad Barre’s military regime in Somalia. Abdi-
razak was brought to the Commissioner’s office later that day and
instructed to take his shoes off. When he refused to do so, he spent the
rest of the day in the jailhouse.
Abdirazak returned to the office the next day in an environment
thick with tension. Two days later, Captain Fitzpatrick told Abdirazak
that if he insisted on disobedience, he could be shot and easily become
another war casualty. Emboldened by his readings of the literature
produced by the evolving Somali Youth League (SYL), Abdirazak con-
tinued to take the signaled mail to the supervisor’s desk without tak-
ing his shoes off. Given the situation, Captain Fitzpatrick decided to
change his tactics by attempting to buy him off. A few days later, Fitz-
patrick sent with his Somali driver, Hilooleh, an authorization for
Abdirazak to buy several quintals of rationed grain for his own use. At
that time, there was a shortage of these goods and, therefore, someone
who brought such items to market could make a killing. Captain Fitz-
patrick had already used this tactic to make up for the indignities to
which he subjected his auxiliaries, particularly Hilooleh. The truce
between Abdirazak and Fitzpatrick did not last long. Several days
later, Fitzpatrick came over to Abdirazak’s workstation while the latter
was receiving messages on the signal. He noted immediately that
Abdirazak did not stand up when the boss walked into the office. He
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then kicked the chair on which Abdirazak was sitting. Abdirazak got
up and swung at his supervisor. They struggled and then Fitzpatrick,
who was much stronger, nailed him on the ground. Abdirazak used
his legs around Fitzpatrick’s neck to push him and got on top of the
big man. Fitzpatrick then called for the Illaalo, who quickly came to the
rescue. Abdirazak was taken to prison and remained there for the rest
of the day.
It was during those hours in prison that Abdirazak decided to try to
physically eliminate this “colonialist.” As a good Moslem, he con-
vinced himself that he would go to heaven if he undertook such a
righteous act. Accordingly, he went to the local blacksmith to order a
dagger. He then decided to upset Fitzpatrick by taking the office keys
and, in the process, prevent Hilooleh from moving one of the station’s
batteries to the boss’s residence after work. Fitzpatrick was incensed
and instructed the driver to fetch Abdirazak, but to no avail. When
Abdirazak reported for work the next morning, Fitzpatrick was wait-
ing for him at the entrance. Fitzpatrick tripped him as he tried to get
into the office and fighting broke out. Abdirazak reached for his dag-
ger as the two men wrestled on the ground, but was unable to access
the weapon. Finally, Fitzpatrick freed himself and ran out of the office
toward the ration store that was some distance away. An Italian
named Rosi, married to a Somali woman, kept the store. Abdirazak
chased after his boss, who shouted for Rosi to open the door, and then
rushed in. Rosi came out and tried to calm the situation. A few minutes
later, Abdirazak walked to the river and threw his dagger into the
muddy water and then went home. Soon, a contingent of the police
surrounded his living quarters, took away his government-provided
rifle, and then escorted him to prison. Abdirazak’s assistant at the Sig-
nal informed the central command in Mogadishu. Colonel Shaw, the
head of the Signal Squadron, was an arrogant man who knew about
Abdirazak’s earlier complaints. Shaw immediately instructed that
Abdirazak be transferred to Mogadishu. Fitzpatrick ignored that
order, claiming that Abdirazak was a criminal who should be treated
accordingly. He commanded the prison guards to take Abdirazak to
the town’s market square, where he announced, through an inter-
preter, who the prisoner was and then underscored that such would be
the fate of anyone who disobeyed the laws of the authorities. This was
calculated to humiliate Abdirazak, who was a popular figure — the
only SYL member in town who, in addition, did a lot of favors for peo-
ple who needed to send or receive messages from relatives elsewhere
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in Somalia. Moreover, merchants in the area often asked him to find
out what grain prices were in different regions of the country. But Fitz-
patrick was adamant and made surprise visits to the prison to make
sure that Abdirazak was treated as any other “criminal.” During the
day, the prisoners were used as labor to collect firewood. To prevent
escape, pairs were tied together. Fitzpatrick followed the prisoners on
several occasions to insure that Abdirazak labored. His replacement in
the office, Mr. Lawaha, arrived. Finally, the Commissioner convened a
court to try Abdirazak. When asked what he had to say about the case,
Abdirazak replied that since Fitzpatrick was judge and jury, he would
appeal, whatever the verdict. After a few such games, Fitzpatrick told
his captive that he could be condemned to death, but given the fairness
of British law he would be sentenced to twelve years in prison. After
word spread about the sentence, authorities in Mogadishu ordered the
prisoner transferred to the main city. While Abdirazak remained in
prison for a while, the Somali prison inspector treated him favorably
by unofficially exempting him from the harsh labor to which other
prisoners were subjected.
The central command finally sent three prison wardens from
Mogadishu to fetch Abdirazak. The senior Somali prison inspector in
Mogadishu was Osman Mohamed Cadde, later a minister in Abdi-
razak’s regime. Abdirazak remained in this prison for eight months,
with the assignment to clean the house of the British head warden and
wash the clothes. His sister and the wives of some of the other prison-
ers fed Abdirazak and his mates during this period. The British author-
ities interviewed the prisoner about his case and his appeal was sent to
Nairobi. The authorities in Nairobi questioned the merits of the case
and ordered his release. Abdirazak was impressed with the fairness of
the judgment. This was late in 1946.
Abdirazak decided to spend some time in Jigjiga and Dire Dawa
where two of his brothers were said to have a trucking business. He
looked for a way to get to his destination via Hargeisa. He found a mil-
itary convoy transporting decommissioned soldiers to northern Soma-
lia, and the commanding British officer offered him a ride. It took a
week to reach Hargeisa, and Mohamed Jama Badmaah, who would
later become a member of Abdirazak’s regime, was among the men
traveling back to the North. Abdirazak’s small suitcase that contained
some of his money was stolen on the eve of arriving in Hargeisa. He
found some relatives in Hargeisa who took care of him, but his chief
companions during his two-month stay in the town were Northern
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members of the Signal Squadron whom he had never met before in
person. He describes Hargeisa’s social climate as both dynamic and
amusing. One of the things that caught his immediate attention was
the large number of the town’s male population carrying sticks and
clubs. Finally he left for Dire Dawa where he found out that his broth-
ers’ trucking business was failing. In Dire Dawa, he studied the Quran
and Islam under the tutelage of Sh. Omar Azhari, a popular Somali
Sheikh who took Abdirazak under his wing.
It was here that Abdirazak became aware of Haile Selassie’s politi-
cal agenda for Eritrea and Somalia. Abdirazak met Jama Urdooh, who
owned a teashop in Dire Dawa, and the two decided to ask for permis-
sion to establish a SYL branch in town. The Ethiopians welcomed the
idea, assuming that the SYL could be a vehicle for their plan to bring
Somalia into a greater Ethiopia. Jama Urdooh bought a few pieces of
furniture for an office, where there were weekly gatherings attended
by Somalis who made some money from the transit trade. Sometime
later, Abdirazak decided to return to Somalia. In preparation, he
bought several sacks of onions and coffee and left for Jigjiga. There he
met Fitzpatrick who offered him a job in his office but he declined.
Fitzpatrick then gave some money to cover the trip to Mogadishu. Fitz-
patrick was a paternalistic colonialist who believed that a Somali
nationalist could easily be bribed into subservience. Upon arrival,
Abdirazak sold his goods and, for a while, toyed with the idea of
becoming a merchant.
Abdirazak then met many of his former friends in the Signal
Squadron who urged him to reapply for his old post. His application
was accepted in late 1946. Shortly thereafter, he was transferred to
Iskushuban. It was here that he would meet Abdirashid Ali Shar-
marke, a young government clerk. Abdirashid was a popular fellow
who loved to wear a Turko-Egyptian hat. Already, he had completed
eight years of formal education, became fluent in Italian, spoke good
Arabic, and picked up basic English during the British administration
of Southern Somalia. All in all, he was among the best educated of his
generation.
On his way to his assignment in Iskushuban, Abdirazak spent some
time in Boosaaso and helped establish a SYL branch.8 Later that year,
Abdirashid and Abdirazak opened the SYL branch in Iskushuban and
other villages in the region. They were expected to write monthly
reports about SYL activities in the region and submit them to the cen-
tral office in Mogadishu. The British encouraged the establishment of
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the SYL in the country, hoping to use it as an instrument for support-
ing the British Labor government’s policy of unifying Somali territo-
ries. Nearly all key SYL members were government employees.
Yasin Osman Sharmarke suggested, before he died in 1947, that
Abdillahi Issa, a clerk in the Department of Public Works, be elected
secretary general in a subsequent congress. Abdirashid, who was
transferred to Mogadishu, joined the party’s Central Committee and
became an active writer. In 1948, Abdirazak was transferred to
Mogadishu to supervise others as well as for further training.
III. Party Stewardship and Decolonization
The peace treaty between Italy and the Allies promulgated that Italy’s
former colonies must be given a chance to voice their wishes. This led
to the creation of the Four Powers Commission, assigned to visit the
colonies and inquire into the sentiments of the population. Before the
visit to Mogadishu, the Italian representatives invested a great deal of
energy and resources in Somalia to win the locals over. One of their
first tactics was an announcement that all those who were employed
by the former Italian administration, even for a short duration, were to
be rehired with full back pay. Moreover, the Italians used a lot of their
own, who were administrators under the tutelage of the British in
Mogadishu and elsewhere. The Somali population who worked for the
Italians was estimated at 13,000 and, despite the shame associated with
any pro-Italian views, many took the bait.9
The conflict between the Italians (together with their Somali sup-
porters) and the SYL-inspired population came to a head when it was
the SYL’s turn to make its case to the Commission. The British tacitly
supported the SYL. However, the SYL was aware that the French and
Soviets were opposed to the British agenda. The Soviets expected the
Italian Communist Party to win that country’s 1948 election. Among
the pro-Italian groups were parties from Mogadishu, called the “Con-
ference,” and others from Upper Jubba and Majeerteenia. The anti-Ital-
ian groups included the SYL and Benadiria. Many Somalis came from
all the country and from as far as Dire Dawa to support the SYL.
Although Abdillahi Issa was the party’s secretary, it was Michael Mar-
iano, a Northern Somali, and another lawyer by the name of Salol
(Indian mother and Somali father) who wrote all SYL documents.
These two proposed to the leadership that the Party should approach
the British, who might support Somali unification. But the leadership
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ignored the suggestion as it was worried that such a stance might push
Ogaden and Majeerteen Somalis who had been raided by the British to
support the Italian position. The SYL leadership was neither politically
sophisticated nor highly educated. Hence, they were not able to work
out a plan that would generate public support for a continued British
administration of all Somali territories, as well as valorize the march
toward eventual independence. The Commission traveled to all
regions, except Baydhabo. The first showdown took place in
Mogadishu, and the SYL, whose agenda called for ten years of United
Nations Trusteeship rule of Somalia, readied its supporters to walk to
the central square to present the case to the Commission. This was to
happen at 3:00 p.m. But by 11:00 a.m., a group of pro-Italian Somalis
armed with swords raided the SYL head office and killed several peo-
ple. SYL leaders who were organizing the march at Dhagaxtuur
rushed to the office and one of its members who had a pistol fired at
the hostile crowd. A police inspector named Bashir Ali Qoslaye went
to the police armory, blasted its gate open, and told SYL supporters to
help themselves to the weapons. Abdirazak was one of those who par-
took in this raid. Since it was SYL policy not to take acts of revenge
against Somali attackers but rather to target their Italian bosses, a small
and armed group, including Abdirazak, decided to confront the Italian
mayor of Mogadishu. Fifty-three Italians were killed and the Gover-
nor, upon hearing about the mayhem in town, speedily left his office
and took refuge in the Catholic Church. The police intervened early
that afternoon and restored calm. The SYL march went on and they
submitted their petition to the Commission.
Later, the SYL dispatched Abdillahi Issa to New York as a represen-
tative when the Commission deliberated. Abdirashid was the acting
party secretary and Haji Mohamed Abdirazak was its president. The
first president of the SYL was Abdikadir Sh. Sakhaw Diin, a popular
religious cleric who wrote many hymns. His moving songs included a
nationalist one, “Ya ayyuha al-Somali, qum, khudh al-musdas wa la tanum
inna nuhayyika.” (You, Somali, get up. Take a rifle and do not sleep. We
will bring you back to Life.) Abdillahi Issa was enthusiastically met in
London by Northern Somalis who lived there. Again, Somali residents
in New York, who were mostly Northerners, hosted and maintained
the delegation for the duration of its stay, since the SYL did not have
the resources to completely support its agents’ travel costs. Abdillahi
Issa lived with Ismail Ahmed Ijeeh, who would later also accommo-
date Abdirazak in his home.
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The Four Powers Commission failed to reach an agreement about
how to dispose of former Italian colonies in Africa, and the matter was
referred to the United Nations. In the meantime, there had been a shift
in alliance due to government changes in Britain and the defeat of the
Italian Communist Party in that country’s election. Now Britain sup-
ported Italy’s claim while the Soviets opposed it. Once the Somali pop-
ulation in Mogadishu found out about the agreement between Britain
and Italy, large demonstrations took place. In December 1949, the U.N.
General Assembly resolved that Italy should administer Somalia on a
ten-year trusteeship basis, with an advisory council that would annu-
ally report on Somalia’s progress. The council consisted of delegates
from Egypt, Colombia, and the Philippines.
Italy took over the Somali administration on March 1, 1950, despite
resistance from many Somalis. At this time, Abdirazak was the post-
master in Baydhabo where he replaced an Italian who worked for the
British. He received the telegram that informed the British Governor of
Upper Jubba about the U.N. resolution. The Britons were angry at their
government’s decision to support Italy, particularly when most Soma-
lis did not wish the return of an Italian administration to their country.
Many Somalis in Baydhabo were pro-Italian and were kept in check
by the police. These supporters celebrated as if it was Independence
Day as soon as the Italian administration returned to the area. The new
Governor, Copasso of Upper Jubba, was the former fascist administra-
tor of the region, and his project was to recreate the political landscape
by delegitimizing the SYL, in order to convince the U.N. to extend its
tenure to thirty years. The Italians mobilized the support of the sympa-
thizers in the region, which ultimately led to the formation of Hizbiya-
Digil Mirifle.
Abdirazak and Ahmed Dahir, a clerk at the district office, were seen
as the key SYL agents, despite the fact that Mohamoud Abdi Noor
(Juujeh), who later became a minister in the Somali government, was
the Party’s secretary in Baydhabo. Abdirazak was in a strategic posi-
tion as head of the Signal, which put him in touch with Mogadishu on
a daily basis. So the SYL in Mogadishu knew of developments in dif-
ferent regions of the country even before the Italian administrators in
the colonial capital. Abdirazak had his first confrontation with the Ital-
ian military police when one of them came to the postal office and tried
to enter an area designated for “Staff Only.” Abdirazak stood up to
him, but the Italian paid no attention and proceeded to enter the pro-
scribed area. Abdirazak stopped him, an action that exasperated the
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officer who promised retribution. Later, Abdirazak wrote a long letter,
in English, to the District Commissioner (D.C.) informing him about
the incident, with the reminder that such behavior was an affront to
the trusteeship’s mandate. The Commissioner never replied. A day
later, Abdirazak was summoned to the Commissioner’s house where
an interpreter (Ibrahim Uno) was initially present but then ordered to
leave. The Commissioner informed Abdirazak that he read his file and
noticed his quick promotions. Moreover, he relayed that Italy intended
to fulfill its U.N. mandate but that the SYL was an extremist organiza-
tion that would not help the project. Abdirazak retorted that the SYL
was not the organization described. The D.C. then suggested that they
work together. Abdirazak replied that he was satisfied with his current
assignment. Finally, the D.C. indicated that he could keep his member-
ship in the SYL, but could collaborate with the administration politi-
cally. Abdirazak declined the offer, a response in accordance with a
SYL memorandum handed to the Italian administration and distrib-
uted to all the party’s branches.
A few days later, the regional administration decided to push “non-
Baydhabo” Somalis out of town—an edict that would present pro-Ital-
ians an opportunity to attack them at night. Sympathetic locals, who
did not want to be identified with SYL by the Italians, leaked the
cabal’s intention. Abdirazak and his colleagues sent a message to
Mogadishu warning party leaders of the Italian plan for Baydhabo.
They responded by forwarding a small amount of ammunition. At
11:00 p.m. of the designated night, several Italian officers, including
the D.C. and the military police and one Somali Illaalo, came to Abdi-
razak’s residence and told him they wanted to search the house for
weapons. Abdirazak asked them if they had a warrant and the Com-
missioner responded that they were the authorities who issued the
warrant. While this exchange was taking place, others slipped into his
backyard and placed a bomb on the property. The search proceeded
and ultimately discovered the planted bomb. The only other item they
found in the house, besides Abdirazak’s clothes, was his SYL member-
ship card. He was immediately handcuffed and taken out to be
“taught a lesson” for challenging authority. The military police and
two other uniformed Italians physically assaulted him repeatedly. He
was later taken to a prison cell where others were kept. Soon, the oth-
ers were removed and he became the sole occupant of the cell. The
senior Somali prison warden was a pro-Italian man from Mogadishu,
an inspector named Daud Abdilla Hersi, who became the command-
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ing general of the Somali military after independence. During that first
night, there was an Italian orchestrated riot to chase SYL sympathizers
from town. Similar events were reported from Kismayo, Galkayo and
Jamama.
Abdirazak did not realize that he was spitting blood as a result of
the beating until the following morning. He then came down with a
fever and could not eat the meager prison rations provided. No one
checked on his condition until the fourth day, when a Somali prison
inspector opened the cell door. He was shocked and asked why there
was so much blood in the cell. He immediately went to the D.C.’s
office and reported that the man in that cell was dying. The two came
together and the D.C. asked Abdirazak what happened, but he did not
respond. The Somali inspector then went to the Governor and told him
about Abdirazak’s condition. Disturbed by what he saw, the Governor
called his staff, including the D.C., and inquired about what had hap-
pened. Everyone pretended that they did not know. An ambulance
took Abdirazak to the hospital.10 After a quick examination, the doctor
announced that nothing was wrong with the patient. The Governor
was flabbergasted and instructed the prison inspector that Abdirazak
was to be moved to one of the bigger cells and that the door should be
kept open during the day. In addition, the prisoner could get food
from outside, if he could afford it. The Somali inspector was so moved
by Abdirazak’s condition that the two became lifelong friends.
Although the supply of better food and fresh air did Abdirazak some
good, he continued to cough blood and developed a fever.
A few days later, one of the Somali prison guards told Abdirazak
and his fellow political prisoners that the D.C. and his staff planned to
free them soon, but he advised them not to leave the prison, as the Ital-
ians had organized a mob to finish them off after their release. Soon,
the authorities acted accordingly, but Abdirazak and his fellow
inmates refused to leave the prison. Shortly thereafter, the fifty politi-
cal prisoners were transferred to Mogadishu’s central prison, where
they met colleagues from other regions of the country. Abdirazak was
again transferred to the local hospital as the prison doctor thought he
had tuberculosis. He was released from prison after nine months in
detention, part of a new Governor’s initiative that freed all prisoners.
But there was a catch. All the freed political prisoners who were for-
mer government employees were barred from returning to their jobs.
Michel Cotts, a private company, hired Abdirazak as a clerk, but his
health deteriorated and he was forced to resign. Feeling that his life
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would be cut short by his poor health anyway, he decided on a drastic
action — to assassinate the Italian administrator of the Trusteeship’s
internal affairs, Mr. Benerdel. Abdirazak believed that Mr. Benerdel
was the chief strategist of the Italian plan to destroy SYL, as well as
boost the ranks of pro-Italian Somalis in order to convince the U.N. to
extend the mandate to thirty years. Abdirazak secured a pistol from a
relative and made numerous attempts to get an appointment with Mr.
Benerdel. He failed in this, as each time he came to the office the
guards asked him to identify his clan. Unwilling to do so and still bent
on his scheme, he mentioned the name of another kin group, otherwise
the guards would automatically label him as a SYL sympathizer.
Before all of this was processed, Mr. Benerdel left for a holiday, and
Abdirazak gave up the idea.
With the help of one of his brothers who heard of his sickness, Abdi-
razak returned to his hometown in 1951 for the first time. He was fed
with heavy doses of roasted goat meat everyday, and made to drink
three cups of fresh camel milk and a cup of ghee a day. This ordeal was
part of the traditional treatment for people suffering from TB and sim-
ilar respiratory diseases. The diet regime lasted for six months and
Abdirazak gained a lot of weight and his cough nearly ceased. He
moved to Galkayo where he was drafted into the SYL’s town commit-
tee and, later, decided to apply for a license to become a public petition
writer (Scrivano publico). The D.C. of Galkayo refused to respond to his
application. After a long wait, he started working as a petition writer
without the license. After a few petitions he wrote for others reached
the D.C., Abdirazak was summoned and asked to explain how he
could operate a business without official permission. He responded
that he had applied for the license but that the government had failed
to even acknowledge his application. The D.C. asked his clerk if Abdi-
razak’s application was on file. When the later replied affirmatively,
the Commissioner immediately approved it. While maintaining him-
self as a petition writer, Abdirazak also became the main speaker at
SYL rallies, a mounting assignment that tested his physical energy as
well as his vocal chords.
The U.N. Advisory Council visited the regions of the Trusteeship
once a year to report on the evolving life of Somalis, and the work the
Italian Government was doing on behalf of the UNO. Led by the
Council, the Egyptian ambassador, Kamal al-Din Salah, stopped once
in Galkayo in 1953. Abdirazak was assigned as the translator during
the visit, and Salah was impressed enough to write a letter, a month
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later, offering him a job, if he would move to Mogadishu. He accepted
the offer after some initial hesitation. His duties were to gather infor-
mation and news in the city, for Salah wanted to know the thinking of
pro-Italian Somalis as well as views within SYL. This was a well pay-
ing appointment that, in addition, gave him an opportunity to meet a
lot of important people.
At this time, the SYL’s popularity was growing, almost in propor-
tion to the degree of its suppression by the Italian administration.
However, the new Governor, Anzilotti, calculated that the Italian’s
tenure as trustees of Somalia could be extended to a couple more
decades if enough local public opinion was mobilized. Consequently,
in a dramatic move, Anzilotti recognized the SYL as the leading politi-
cal party. The SYL welcomed this shift and agreed to work with the
Administration. But Abdillahi Issa, the SYL Secretary, who had just
returned from New York where he led protestations against Italian
rule, was very unhappy when he learned about the understanding
between the Party and the Administration. Aden Abdillah Osman,
then president of the SYL and Vice President of the Territorial Council,
supported the agreement.11 Shortly thereafter, the first municipal elec-
tions were held in 1954.12 The improved relations between the colonial
administration and the SYL notwithstanding, many Italian administra-
tors continued to behave as if nothing had changed. It was during this
period that Abdirazak came of age as a prominent actor in the Somali
Youth League. In 1955, the Party wanted to send a delegate to the U.N.
headquarters to present its case to the Trusteeship. Although he was
working for the Egyptian Embassy and was not a member of the Cen-
tral Committee, Abdirazak was chosen to carry the sentiments of the
Party. Despite the honor, the selection underscored for him the dearth
of educated Somalis who could handle such a complex task with the
necessary alacrity. He shared his diffidence with the acting secretary of
the SYL, Haji Farah Ali Omer. In the end, after some collective com-
miseration, Abdirazak was persuaded of the charge and he started
preparations for travel to New York City.
Hisbia, the pro-Italian party, also selected its delegate, Abdikadir
Mohamed Aden (Zoppo), to go to New York. In the meantime, the two
presidents of the two parties called a joint meeting for the delegates
and instructed them to work together and submit a joint report to the
Trusteeship Council. This was the strategy that had been used by
Aden Abdillah Osman and Hisbia’s president, Mohamed Abdinoor
Hussein, the previous year. Abdikadir Zoppo’s trip was sponsored by
Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar
23
the Administration, while the SYL paid for Abdirazak’s airplane ticket
and a $1,000 allowance to meet the other costs. The two delegates
stayed in Italy for nearly a month in order to avoid the high cost of
staying in New York. All this time, the Italian Government underwrote
Zoppo’s hotel and board. Abdirazak’s meager budget was not a match
for these expenses, and only the intervention of Abdikadir Zoppo him-
self saved the day — the Italian Government also paid part of Abdi-
razak’s bill.
The delegates finally arrived in New York. Zoppo and representa-
tives of the Italian Administration were put up in Imperial Hotel, too
expensive for the SYL delegate who had to settle for a basic motel
named Martinique. In their joint attempt to prepare the report, Zoppo
categorically refused to accept any criticism of the Administration. The
two finally agreed to report to the Council that there was a positive
change in policy, although Italian plantation owners were still exploit-
ing local workers. Zoppo presented the report and Abdirazak
answered the questions raised by the Council. Back in Mogadishu, the
Administration was relieved by the moderate nature of the Report.
They were equally pleased with the “maturity” of Abdirazak, as they
expected caustic criticism given his prison record. Consequently, he
was invited to Italian social events in New York.
Abdirazak received instructions from SYL headquarters that he
should stay in New York and take part in the presentation of the
Report to the General Assembly and in the deliberations of the Fourth
Committee (the committee on decolonization). It was in this context
that he had his first formal encounters with both Ethiopian resistance
to Somalia’s liberation and the indeterminate nature of the Somali-
Ethiopian boundary. Once his duties were done in New York, Abdi-
razak left for London (on the Queen Mary) and then to Mogadishu. He
had to add $90 to his ticket as he had overstayed his original departure
date. Northern Somalis living in New York came to his rescue and
paid for the increase in the fare.
Abdirazak returned to Mogadishu in the midst of the first territorial
legislative election campaign in early 1953. He was not included in the
SYL’s list of candidates, as the law required one to be present in the
territory to be considered for candidacy. The SYL’s Central Committee
gave him a vehicle and a driver and instructed that he campaign on
behalf of the Party in Afmadow, Kismayo, Barawa, Merca, Baydhabo,
Beled Weyn, and other towns in those regions. The SYL won 65 seats
in the new assembly, Hisbia got ten seats, while another ten seats were
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reserved for Italians, Arabs, and Asians. The SYL convened a national
Party conference to elect a new central committee. One of the main
issues on the agenda was how the SYL should deal with pro-Italian
Somalis who had killed people. Delegates agreed that the SYL should
take the high road and forgive the criminals. The conference then
elected its key officers. Aden Abdillah Osman and Abdillahi Issa were
elected to the Presidency of the Legislative Assembly and Premiership,
respectively.13 Abdillahi Issa was still opposed to the SYL’s new rela-
tionship with the Administration and refused to participate in the
meeting. He was finally persuaded to accept his nomination to the new
post, while Abdirazak was elected to the Chairmanship of the Party.
Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was on a study-leave in Italy.
Abdillahi Issa approached several members of the legislative assem-
bly, including Sheikh Ali Jimaaleh, Mohamoud Abdi Noor (Juujeh),
SYL’s party secretary in Baydhabo, Mohamoud Mohamed Farah
(Maalin Guur), Nur Hashi Aalas, Haji Musa Boqor, Haji Omer Ali,
Salaad Abdi Jaago and Omar Jiis to take up ministerial posts. Nearly
all of those nominated declined the offer. They indicated that they had
neither the necessary education nor the experience to competently
manage their assignments. Aden A. Osman, Abdillahi Issa, and other
key members of SYL intensively lobbied them and, after a month,
swayed them into accepting their appointments. On a kin basis, Abdil-
lahi Issa and Haji Farah were not only Hawiye, but were from Saad
subgroup. Haji Musa Boqor and Salaad Abdi were also from the same
subgroup of the Majeerteen. Despite these identities, no one com-
plained about “kin imbalance.” As a matter of fact, Abdillahi Issa did
not use family background as the basis for his appointees. The key to
his selection criteria was a candidate’s knowledge of Italian. The Leg-
islative Assembly easily endorsed the new internal government. Each
minister had an Italian technical advisor who did all the work, leaving
the minister to give his blessing by signing prepared documents. The
privileges for the new Somali elite-in-the-making were immediately
obvious. For instance, each minister was given a government car, a dri-
ver, staff, and a housekeeper. Given these “luxuries,” the ministers
looked well off after a short duration; those who visited them were dri-
ven in these government cars and, at times, given a bit of money. The
general public got wind of this and wrongly assumed that the minis-
ters were well endowed. Because the level of education and political
awareness among the population in general, and the SYL rank and file
in particular, was very low, many jumped to the conclusion that the
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inception of an internal government meant instant prosperity. They
expected the new Somali authority to reward everyone, an attitude
already encouraged by the style in which the Italian Administration
conducted its business. Since their return to Somalia in 1950, Italian
authorities used government employment to reward their Somali sup-
porters, regardless of ability. The exceptions to this form of reward
were a few inherited from the British such as Abdirashid Ali Shar-
marke. Thus, SYL supporters assumed that a SYL administration
would do the same for them. Consequently, many people came to
Mogadishu from the provinces seeking employment or monetary sup-
port from their SYL elected official, particularly ministers. Soon, the
officials’ offices as well as residences were besieged by new migrants
from their respective regions. The public interpreted from the gather-
ing of such crowds that government ministries were allocated along
clan lines, a false conclusion, but it appeared to be so.
With the rumor mill in high gear, many individuals launched com-
plaints about what they deemed to be the clanist behavior of the SYL
government. Abdirazak, as Chairman of the Party, took note of these
concerns, although he understood the fabricated nature of the accusa-
tions—hearsay creating its own reality. He called a meeting for all the
ministers to address and deal with the public perception. Unfortu-
nately, Prime Minister Abdillahi Issa and his cabinet did not take the
issue seriously. They assumed that these false rumors would vanish on
their own. Moreover, government leaders, especially ministers, lacked
any experience in managing public affairs and had little cognizance of
the enormous challenges Somalia faced. There was hardly any vision
of the future; on the contrary, most of them acted as if they were the
guardians of the status quo. Their actions were confined to routine
oversight of whatever the Italian administrators were doing.
Hereafter, tensions developed between some ministers. Sheikh Ali
Jimaaleh, who headed the Department of Social Affairs, Education and
Health, and Mohamoud Abdi Noor (Juujeh) accused Haji Musa Boqor,
of Interior, of abusing his department’s special fund in order to help
their political rivals. Musa, in turn, complained that Abdillahi Issa was
sympathetic to his two accusers due to their kin links to him. More-
over, Sheikh Ali Jimaaleh, too, was equally charged with favoring his
kin group among applicants for employment in his department. The
Prime Minister never called them together to air their conflict, for
Abdillahi Issa was a chivalrous person who disliked conflict. In the
meantime, Abdirazak’s time as chairman was consumed by relentless
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public complaints about various ministers, who were increasingly
testy about his frequent telephone calls. Abdirazak realized that he
could not turn the tide of inter-ministerial conflicts and the growing
resentment of the SYL supporters toward the government’s seeming
inability to address their immediate and often personal concerns. Con-
sequently, he decided not to run for the presidency of the Party in the
forthcoming national conference.
Riven by simmering internal antipathies among some of the Party’s
leading lights, the conference became a platform for the deepening of
differences. Those members who came from regions with ministerial
representation in the cabinet supported the Government while others
were critical of what they said was its “clanist” orientation. These clan-
centered accusations and counter-accusations were not openly articu-
lated but, nonetheless, created a strong subtext for the emerging, and
ultimately self-ruining, political antagonism in Somali elite politics.14
While unable to heal the division, and accompanied by much tension,
the Party elected as President Haji Mohamed Hussein, who was in
Egypt and had a habit of labeling Abdillahi Issa’s government as
quasi-colonial.
Haji Mohamed returned to Mogadishu a few weeks after the Party
conference. He immediately started criticizing the Government as if he
was in the opposition party. The Central Committee warned that he
could not continue his assaults and still remain head of the Party.15 He
refused to heed this warning and was later removed. Aden A. Osman
took over as SYL President. All those who voted for Haji Mohamed’s
presidency resigned from the Party, a third of the SYL membership.
The majority of these were of a particular kin group. Haji Mohamed
and his supporters established a new political party named Greater
Somali League (GREAT, in short). The split of SYL and the develop-
ment of the new party with a “clanist” basis marked a new departure
in national politics and increased the significance of the other sectarian
party in the Trusteeship, Hisbia.
The differences between Abdillahi Issa and Haji Musa Boqor flared
again. Haji Musa’s resignation from the government in 1958 added to
the political problems of SYL. The undiminishing demand by politi-
cians and others to seek audience with the Prime Minister and have
him deal with their “personal” problems forced Abdillahi Issa to
become even less accessible. This situation was compounded by the
dearth of skilled Somalis in leadership positions in the political and
civil service realms to shoulder some of the burden. Moreover, the
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Prime Minister did not initiate a reformist agenda that would improve
bureaucratic competence that could directly respond to the public’s
demands without his involvement in every case.
The Greater Somali League showed a lot of energy but increasingly
became violent. Some of its members physically attacked and severely
wounded the Somali Governor of Benadir, Mr. Ahmed Shuqul. Using
British detention and deportation laws, the Government rounded up
and deported many of those implicated. Some SYL Central Committee
members objected to deporting suspects to their home regions because
such action could have clanist connotations. They suggested prosecu-
tion and imprisonment for those found guilty. In the meantime,
GREAT stressed its anti-colonial and socialist rhetoric, and received
financial support from the Italian Communist Party and states of the
Eastern Bloc. Hisbia, the other opposition party, became weak once the
Italian colonial administration abandoned it. Some of its key leaders
joined the SYL.
Abdirazak was a member of SYL’s Central Committee during this
period. Sh. Ali Jimaaleh appointed him as the nominal head of Somali
University Institute (a two-year community college that offered
courses in politics, economics, and law) located in the center of
Mogadishu. Mr. Pironi, the Italian director of the Institute and Abdi-
razak’s former foe during the Galkayo period, was shocked to learn
about his new superior. Abdirazak was also appointed as the Vice-
President of a Credito Somalo Bank, an institution established to give
credit to farmers and small businesses. These two assignments were
Abdirazak’s sole source of income.
There was little improvement in the Party’s political climate and
matters got worse with the 1959 legislative elections. The SYL Govern-
ment rigged the ballot in some of those areas, particularly in the north-
east of the Trusteeship, where the Greater Somali League was popular.
Nonetheless, several GREAT candidates won seats in the new Legisla-
tive Assembly. The majority of the seats went to the SYL, but this set a
terrible precedent for the country. Even the Italian colonial administra-
tion could not deny that some underhandedness had taken place. In
the end, Abdirazak, who did not campaign in his constituency of
Garawe-Eyl, was elected. Also elected was Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke
(who graduated with a B.A. degree in political science from an Italian
university) from Qardho, where he did not visit or campaign.16 Yasin
Noor Hassan, who was the SYL secretary at Galkayo, was also elected
to the Assembly. Distinctive of the 1959 elections was this: all candidates
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contested in their “home areas,” unlike in 1956, when some members of the
Legislative Assembly were sent by communities not belonging to their kin
group.
The Italian Governor reappointed Abdillahi Issa to the premiership.
Once this became public, most legislative members rushed to the
Prime Minister’s residence to exhort him to include them in his minis-
terial appointments. Some stressed the importance of their “clan” in
the general population and the legislature. This mindset marked a sea
change in the country’s political culture. The more politically con-
scious members of the SYL, such as Noor Hashi Alas and Abdirazak
himself, who were concerned about the new trend, met with the Prime
Minister and urged him to use merit as the basis of selecting his cabi-
net (a cardinal point in the nationalist principles of the SYL) and not to
heed the political pressure of the self-serving clanists. Abdillahi Issa
retorted that clan was a reality, and proceeded to nominate a large cab-
inet in order to accommodate many of the claimants. The young SYL
Turks, including Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, considered the large size
of the cabinet (twice the number of the previous regime), its clan base,
and the poor quality of the ministers to be an affront to the Party’s
integrity. Aden A. Osman, who was president of the Legislative
Assembly, expressed his sorrow over the process, but given his moder-
ate nature did not openly support those critical of the Government.
The latter wrote a letter to the Governor to register their displeasure. In
response, the Governor repeated the earlier assertion of the Prime
Minister that the clan was a reality. The critics took their case to the
Central Committee of the SYL and urged that the Prime Minister be
censored for transgression. But the Central Committee rejected the crit-
ics’ claims who, in turn, accused the Central Committee of being
beholden, as employees, to the Government. The argument came to a
boil and, ultimately, the SYL sacked all the critics from the Central
Committee and the Party.
These former SYL members decided to send a delegation to the
Trusteeship Council in New York in order to challenge the legitimacy
of the Government. Abdirazak was asked by the group to lead a two-
man delegation since he already had experience with the Trusteeship
Council (the other delegate was Ahmed Mohamed Adnan “Kutubo-
hoor”). The alarmed Government tried to delay their departure
through a bureaucratic slowdown of the issuance of their passports. In
the meantime, opposition parties that felt robbed of their electoral suc-
cess also decided to send their representatives to New York to petition
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the Trusteeship Council. Premier Issa’s Administration dispatched two
former pro-Italian Somalis (Abdillahi Haji Mohamed “Insania” and Ali
Mohamed Hirabe), while the colonial establishment sent a strong dele-
gation. To say the least, the presentations to the Council by different
Somali groups were contradictory and chaotic. But nonetheless, the
opposition parties impressed on the Council that the election was
rigged and illegitimate, while Abdirazak, speaking for SYL critics,
described how the Government violated the basic SYL principle of
selecting the cabinet on merit rather than on a “clan” basis, and
unwisely expanded the number of ministers. Members of the Trustee-
ship Council queried whether election results were doctored. Abdi-
razak responded that there were complaints about irregularities but
that the claims could not be verified.
The Italian Government, despite supporting the SYL, was appar-
ently delighted by the conflicts among Somalis although it did not
openly express its feelings. In the meantime, the Egyptian ambassador
to the United Nations alerted the Somalis to a movement afoot in some
circles to reopen discussions on the possibility of extending the dura-
tion of the Italian mandate. He urged the Somalis to take a common
stand to preempt any discussion of this idea. The Somali groups,
including SYL representatives, its critics, and the opposition parties,
agreed to issue a joint declaration on the issue. Somalis crafted the
statement with Egyptian assistance, and Abdirazak presented the com-
mon statement to the Council, which finally blocked the prospect of
extending the mandate. The Somali Administration and the SYL were
pleasantly surprised by the turn of events in New York, as they had
assumed that the critics would spoil everything. Shortly after their
return, Aden A. Osman and a few other members of SYL convinced
the Party to readmit their former colleagues. The critics accepted the
offer but maintained their political stance on the issues without being
very vocal in the Legislative Assembly.
In the North, the British organized the first election for the Protec-
torate’s Legislative Council in February 1960. The Somali National
League (SNL) won the majority of the seats, the United Somali Party
(USP) came in second, and the National United Front (NUF) gained
one seat. The first Somali administration in the North was established
shortly after that election, and the two major parties formed a coalition
government while NUF’s Michael Mariano retained the status of the
opposition. The cabinet consisted of four: the Prime Minister,
Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, and three ministers, namely Ahmed Haji
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Dualeh, Ali Garad Jama, and Haji Ibrahim Noor. A distinguished
Southern parliamentary delegation, led by Aden A. Osman, flew to the
North to observe the election and the formation of its first internal self-
government. They had amicable discussions with Northern political
leaders and invited them to visit Mogadishu. Subsequently, a large
Northern delegation traveled South and spent a month in the city. The
two parties agreed to the speedy unification of the two Somali territo-
ries, and the Northerners were given copies of the draft constitution
and asked to suggest whatever changes or modifications they deemed
necessary. After their return to Hargeisa and examination of the document,
they added one article — an article directing both the establishment of an
autonomous public service commission and the prohibition of state employees
from engaging in partisan politics. The draft constitution was subse-
quently sent back to Mogadishu. Another Southern delegation went to
Hargeisa to partake of the festivities of the North’s Independence Day,
June 26, 1960. Soon after the celebration, Northern leaders, members of
parliament, and department heads in the civil service went to
Mogadishu to participate in the formation of the first government of
the new Somali Republic. Given the absence of enough residential
facilities and hotels in the city, two of Mogadishu’s hotel landmarks,
Jubba and Shabeelle, were quickly built by the Italian Administration.
These hotels accommodated most of the Northern leaders and other
dignitaries who were pouring in to witness the forthcoming inaugura-
tion of the new country.
The first act of the unified Northern and Southern parliaments was
the approval of the Union Act by acclamation. The Parliament then
proceeded to elect the nation’s transitional leaders.17 Aden Abdillah
Osman was unanimously and without competition elected as the tran-
sitional president until the constitutional referendum of 1961. Next, the
Parliament went on to elect its officials. It was at this point that the par-
ties from the North and the South temporarily dissolved as MPs split
into two groups almost equal in number. The two Prime Ministers of
the former British and Italian colonies, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal and
Abdillahi Issa, respectively, led one group. The second group was a
combination of those Southerners critical of the Abdillahi Issa govern-
ment, Northerners who were discontented with Egal’s leadership
qualities, and others whose immediate competitors joined forces to
constitute the first. The second camp elected Abdirashid Ali Shar-
marke as their leader, with no one else coming out to challenge his cre-
dentials. The two groups met separately in Afgoi and Balad to prepare
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themselves for the campaign to elect parliamentary officers and form
the regime. Abdirashid’s group agreed to nominate a Northerner, for-
mer seaman Jama Mohamed Qalib, to the presidency of the Parlia-
ment.18 Mr. Qalib won the contest when Parliament convened, and this
victory gave Abdirashid’s group great confidence that they might in
fact have a majority to form united Somalia’s first regime. But the
SYL’s Central Committee support for the Egal/Issa camp tempered
this initial euphoria.
The campaign gathered momentum and President Aden continued
to consult with different members of Parliament, religious leaders, and
the public. Finally, in a surprising move, the President appointed
Abdirashid as his designated Prime Minister. The message was deliv-
ered to Abdirashid’s house in a pink envelope. President Aden charac-
terized Abdirashid as the “most qualified person” in Parliament to
lead the administration of the state. Once the announcement was
made, all ambitious politicians rushed to the designated Prime Minis-
ter to offer him advice and seek ministerial appointments. Abdirazak,
a key organizer of the Abdirashid camp, and also a close friend, stayed
away from the constantly crowded residence. But the two talked on
the telephone and the Prime Minister inquired about when they could
get together. A few days later, they agreed to take a drive and have a
meal in Afgoi. The Prime Minister-Designate told Abdirazak that most
of those who came to advise him suggested that he select his ministers
from both camps in Parliament. Abdirazak told him to think carefully
about the implications of this advice as those from the other camp
would constitute opposition within his cabinet. But the Prime Minister
was more concerned about a divided nation than a split government,
and, shortly thereafter, called all parliamentarians into a meeting in
which he solicited everyone to support his planned coalition adminis-
tration. Most members present in the meeting concurred and, conse-
quently, he appointed the leaders of the opposition, Abdillahi Issa and
Mohamed Egal to Foreign Affairs and Defense, respectively. Abdi-
razak was appointed, without prior consultation, to head the Ministry
of Interior. Abdikadir Mohamed Aden (Zoppo), from the Digil Mirifle
Party, was assigned the Ministry of Finance, while Mohamoud Abdi
Noor Juujeh (also from Upper Jubba), who had better nationalist cre-
dentials, was left out of the new cabinet.19
The coalition regime immediately generated political dynamics that
have become the hallmark of Somali elite politics ever since. Those in
Abdirashid’s camp who were not appointed were extremely bitter as
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they felt that their opponents were given undeserved ministerial posts.
Similarly, those in the opposition accused their leaders of betrayal.
Despite these fulminations of letdown, the only official opposition in
Parliament was Michael Mariano, the Christian and highly capable
Somali from the North. Neither of the two major groups considered
him for a post, and significant numbers of Northerners who opposed
him were religious men. Overlooking Mariano was a capital mistake
given his qualifications and experience. The stakes were set for the
Somali Republic’s first democratic order.
IV. Democracy and Elite Politics in the First Republic
The new coalition’s tenure was limited to one year and its mandate
was to integrate the Northern and Southern civil service into a single
national structure, and to guide the country until its first constitutional
referendum. The regime set up a commission, mostly staffed by United
Nations employees, to integrate the two administrative systems.20 The
first step in civil service reform was to bring all the heads of depart-
ments in the North to Mogadishu, and many of them were reap-
pointed as national leaders in their respective fields. Among these
were Mohamoud Abdi Arraleh, Abdirahman Aby Farah, Abdirahim
Aby Farah, Ali Sheikh, and Ali Said Arraleh. Southern civil servants
resented the apparent Northern domination of the upper echelons of
the new structures, but the integration process proceeded ahead and
apace.
The leaders of the parliamentary group who lost to Abdirashid’s
camp turned their disappointment into an opposition to the forthcom-
ing constitutional plebiscite. Northern elements among them were
linked with some civil servants still in the North, such as the Governor
of the entire region, Osman Ahmed Indoole,21 a man with two years of
advanced training in public administration who became the first
Somali Governor of Hargeisa. Unlike the Governor, his deputy,
Ahmed Jama Jengalee, supported the regime’s position on the referen-
dum. Another key Northerner, Jama Mohamed Qalib, commanded the
police in Hargeisa. He wrote confidential police reports to Mogadishu
that described the anti-constitutional activities of some senior officials
in Hargeisa. As Minister of Interior, Abdirazak reviewed these reports
and was concerned about the impact of such activities on public policy.
He decided to pay an official visit to Hargeisa. John Drysdale, a former
British colonial officer, retained by the regime to write a history of the
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Somali peninsula, warned Abdirazak that his visit would not be suc-
cessful and that he would have a lot of trouble with the opposition in
Hargeisa.22 It turned out to be a tough but worthy time in Hargeisa,
where he confronted the Governor and other opposition civil servants.
His meetings with the traditional elders and other civic leaders, pep-
pered with a sense of mutual esteem, were more constructive. He
stressed to them that the constitutional referendum was the first signif-
icant act of the nation’s independence and a test of the nation’s alle-
giance to democracy. One of the more amusing incidents he came
across was the reaction of many Northerners who were surprised to
witness his extraordinary capacity for public speaking. Apparently, it
was a common stereotype among some Northerners that Southerners
spoke poor and broken Somali and were perhaps better in Kiswahili.
When he returned from the week’s sojourn, Drysdale paid another
visit and congratulated him for a successful tour, one that impressed
many diplomats by the imaginative way Abdirazak had defused ten-
sions in Hargeisa.
Immediately, Abdirazak transferred some of the key Northern
opposition members in the civil service in his Ministry, with the excep-
tion of the Governor, to other regions of the country. He urged other
ministers to do likewise. Mindful of the legacy of the 1959 election in
the South, Abdirazak worked very hard to insure that the forthcoming
plebiscite was conducted with utmost probity. In that spirit, he wrote
to the President of Parliament informing him that the opposition
should station their representatives in all polling stations for the dura-
tion of the referendum. The opposition came out into the open when
this declaration was announced. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, the Minister
of Defense, was overtly in the opposition, but Prime Minister Abdi-
rashid did not sanction him. The most vocal and active opponent in the
constitutional referendum, however, was Sheikh Ali Jimaaleh.
The referendum took place in the spring of 1961, and the major
opposition turned out to be from the central part of the Northern
region. No irregularities in voting were reported by the opposition
from the North, but that was not the case in two hamlets in the South,
Wanlaweyn and Adale, where government officers clearly rigged the
ballots. In the former, the District Commissioner, a former pro-Italian
named Ibrahim Police, told the illiterate and poor public that anyone
who voted “no” would be counted as Christian. Moreover, both Dis-
trict Commissioners stuffed all the ballots into the “yes” boxes to such
an extent that, in the end, the two villages had more voters than the
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resident populations. To be sure, these two fraudulent cases marred
what was otherwise an overwhelmingly free and fair constitutional
referendum. Nonetheless, when all was said and done, the majority of
the electorate supported the constitution, and the significant negative
vote in the central region of the North only underscored what became
convincingly obvious: the two breaches in the South were not deliber-
ate government policy, as the Minister of Interior immediately
removed the two District Commissioners responsible for the irregular-
ities, and the Civil Service Commission reprimanded and demoted
them.
Once the referendum was over, the nation’s first order of business
was to elect a new president as Aden A. Osman’s one-year tenure was
coming to an end. The Government’s candidate was Aden and the
opposition nominated Sheikh Ali Jimaaleh. A vigorous campaign
ensued in parliament as the two camps tried to win a majority of the
deputies to their side. Manipulation of clanist interests came to the fore
in this election. The opposition made innuendoes to the effect that
Abdirashid’s regime was dominated by the Majeerteen kin group.
Consequently, the ranks of the Southern opposition were linked to
Abdillahi Issa and united with ambitious Northerners. As a matter of
fact, Abdirashid’s cabinet consisted of a collection of disparate MPs,
many of whom were from his 1960 parliamentary bloc. Both the oppo-
sition and the Government paid off MPs to win their votes. Aden did
not partake in these transactions. Many MPs were eager to sell their
votes but did not openly ask for bribes. Rather, they often pretended
that they had guests from their constituencies who needed help to
return home. In this milieu, the opposition, especially the Somali Great
League, had significant resources as a direct result of support they had
garnered from the USSR and the Eastern Bloc.
The Constitution stipulated that a presidential candidate must gain
a two-thirds majority in Parliament to win on the first ballot. Neither
Aden nor his challenger Sheikh Ali attained the necessary number.
Aden led by two votes in the first ballot, but the balance remained vir-
tually the same in the second and third. The vote was conducted
through a secret ballot, and some of the MPs could barely write the
name of the two candidates. In one instance, the ballot of an MP could
not be read with certainty; it was decided that it be added to Sheikh
Ali’s column. In the end, Aden was elected President with a simple
majority, and he was immediately sworn in as President of the Repub-
lic by Chief Justice Qadi, a member of the Supreme Court. After some
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brief consultations with different stakeholders, he reappointed Abdi-
rashid as Prime Minister. Then he reconstituted his cabinet in the spirit
of a coalition government. Egal became Minister of Education while
Abdirazak retained his post. Nonetheless, the reappointment of those
ministers who were in opposition to the Constitution did not alter their
political stance.
All was not well in the central part of the Northern region. Given
the negative vote on the constitutional referendum but the overwhelm-
ing vote of approval by the rest of the nation, expressions of disillu-
sionment over Somali unification were in the air. Several months after
the new regime took charge of the nation’s affairs, a small group of
young Northern military officers attempted a coup in Hargeisa. This
move surprised both Jama Mohamed Qalib, on whose meticulous
police reports from Hargeisa the Government so depended, and even
opposition politicians from the North such as Egal, until recently the
Minister of Defense. The principal claim of the young officers, who
were trained in Britain, was that poorly educated officers from the
South had been undeservedly given most command appointments.
The initiators of the coup claimed they had the blessings of the
Supreme military chief, General Daud A. Hersi. To say the least, this
event shocked the regime, and General Hersi instantly denied the
accusation over Radio Mogadishu. Northern non-commissioned offi-
cers immediately reacted to the General’s announcement and moved
against the coup instigators; the loyalists recaptured Radio Hargeisa
and killed one of the coup makers. The rest were captured and order
was quickly restored. The Interior and Defense Ministers, the latter the
Northern Sheikh Ali Ismail, immediately flew to Hargeisa. At the
regional military command, they congratulated the loyalists and then
convened a public meeting in the afternoon in which Sheikh Ali Ismail
made a moving speech. He castigated the fomenters of the coup and
opposition in the North, but went too far by suggesting that the coup
makers might be hanged. While some of the public seemed unhappy
with what they considered a regime dominated by the “Majeerteen
Abdis” (Abdirashid and Abdirazak), there was no sign that they sup-
ported the coup. Abdirazak spoke in a conciliatory tone and told the
gathered public that something unfortunate had happened, including
the loss of an educated Somali, and it should be a warning to the entire




Many Northerners sought forgiveness for the plotters. A few went
to the President to seek his intervention, but Aden responded that
what they were asking him to do was not within his legal authority.
Others approached the Prime Minister for clemency, while a few
respected Northerners, such as Haji Basbaas, asked for the Minister of
Interior’s good offices in the matter. In the end, the regime decided
that it did not want to set a precedent for the extralegal treatment of
the case, and, therefore, started making preparations for a trial. North-
erners accepted the proposition that the case could be heard in a civil
rather than a military court, and that non-Somali and British trained
lawyers be found to defend the accused. The regime initially rejected
the need for foreign lawyers but the President persuaded his col-
leagues to honor this request as well. The Prime Minister was concilia-
tory and did not want the physical elimination of the accused, but
Sheikh Ali Ismail and a few other Northerners felt strongly that coup
plotters should be treated swiftly and harshly. The final accord
between the state prosecutors and the two British lawyers stipulated
that the court procedure would be that of the North (Indian) but the
substance of the law would be Southern (Italian).
Soon the funds collected by the immediate families and supporters
of the accused proved insufficient to pay for the British lawyers. The
state decided to cover the balance. As the case went forward, the crim-
inal facts against the accused seemed immutable. However, the public
prosecutor made a minor procedural error and the judge quickly dis-
missed the entire case on technical grounds. There were celebrations in
Hargeisa, but other Somalis felt that the judge was biased. In the ensu-
ing cabinet meeting to discuss options, the Minister of Defense was
among the angriest over the decision. With the recognition that the
regime had the right to appeal the case, the Prime Minister consulted
with the President and the two decided the state should drop the case.
Limiting its reactions to a condemnation of the judgment, the regime
expelled the judge from the country, and the coup instigators regained
their freedom. This was the first time (and maybe the last) in Africa’s post-
independence that a sitting regime released coup makers without any retribu-
tion.
Three items dominated the agenda for the next two and half years:
reintegration and reform of the civil service; finding a major power to
train and arm the Somali military; and development planning. Civil
service reform continued under the guidance of a well-known Pak-
istani development economist who headed the UNDP office in
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Mogadishu. It was also under these auspices that the first five-year
plan was produced, an idea borrowed from India. Regime dealings
with major powers were in part guided by advice from President
Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt who passed on his thinking to Prime
Minister Abdirashid during a visit to Egypt. Nasser gave this synopsis
of non-alignment: “Somalia must avoid political extremism. The West
is very powerful and our Soviet friends have their own interests. Do
not let yourself be used by either; be very careful.” The regime took his
advice and stuck to a neutral internationalist position, and then joined
the Non-aligned Movement. Despite such a Somali stance, the Soviets
funded several projects, such as the Tug Wajaleh farm, hospitals in
Sheikh and Wagid, a government printing press, milk and meat pro-
cessing plants, and the Benadir High School.
Meanwhile, the political rumor mill was working overtime both in
the North and South. A key subject of these currents was the ostensible
Majeerteen domination of high politics, in the personalities of the
Prime Minister and his Interior Minister. Concurrently, the pressure on
ministers to be in their offices and meet the public was unrelenting.
Abdirazak was mindful of the dilemma this created. If ministers
stayed in their office and met visitors, very little work would be done,
but if they minimized this task and concentrated on their functional
responsibilities, the result would be bad public relations. Conse-
quently, Abdirazak decided to devote three days to see the public and
the remaining working days (and many after-hours) to attend to his
official duties. The Prime Minister saw that his Interior Minister was
working long hours and advised him to mind his health. Abdirashid
was not a micro-manager and let his ministers run their affairs. This
was, in part, due to his attempts to avoid giving substance to the
rumors of clan domination. Sensing the political pressure the rumors
were generating, Abdirazak visited with the Prime Minister and told
him that he wanted to undercut the veracity of these rumors by offer-
ing his resignation. He reminded the Prime Minister that the two of
them were not only close friends but, also, that their grandmothers
were sisters. The Prime Minister was not persuaded by the argument
and declined to accept the resignation. Abdirazak then sought the sup-
port of the President to convince the PM of the wisdom of his proposi-
tion. Aden was not persuaded but, in the end, decided to take up the
matter with the Prime Minister. Finally, President Aden, Prime Minis-
ter Abdirashid, and Minister Abdirazak met and discussed who could
take over the post. Abdirazak suggested Mr. Egal23 as his possible
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replacement, but the PM decided to appoint Mohamoud Abdi Noor
(Juujeh) of Baydhabo.24 Abdirazak was moved to the Ministry of Public
Works.
Three major issues stand out in Abdirazak’s performance during his
tenure at Public Works. These projects singled him out as an upright
and activist minister, with an uncommon vision: the reorganization of
the ministry and an anti-corruption drive; the renegotiation with the
Soviets; and the creation of Somali Airlines and a telephone bid. The
Ministry of Public Works was less complicated politically but a chal-
lenging portfolio to manage as it dealt with technical issues. Abdi-
razak’s predecessor, Abdinoor Mohamed Hussein, was an elderly man
who was an interpreter for the Italians. He had not been an energetic
minister and had offered little leadership and direction to his staff. Ali
Sheikh, from the North and Somalia’s first certified engineer, was the
ministry’s Director General. Public Works was the lead ministry in
expanding the nation’s extremely modest infrastructure. It managed
many development projects, mostly funded by the U.S.S.R. These
activities required administrative capacity well beyond that of the
ministry. Abdirazak met with the only foreign consultant, a British cit-
izen, and reassigned him to work as an operation’s officer, a responsi-
bility more in the thicket of everyday activities. Next, Abdirazak
conferred with the Soviet ambassador and the Russian technical advi-
sor to the projects in Somalia. He impressed upon them that the opera-
tional officer of the ministry, despite his nationality, was to be seen as a
critical figure in the implementation of projects under the ministry’s
purview.
The Soviets complained a great deal about the progress of the pro-
jects. Most of the delays were due to the heavy congestion at the
Mogadishu port facilities and untrained personnel. Abdirazak con-
vened a meeting of his senior staff and discussed the matter. They con-
cluded that the problem was that the projects’ schedules were too
ambitious for the country’s capabilities. Subsequently, the Minister
and the Soviets orally modified the agreement on project schedules
and the speed of their implementation to their mutual satisfaction.
Another area that required immediate attention was the misuse of the
Ministry’s resources. Portions of project materials, such as cement,
were routinely privately sold by employees, particularly by those who
oversaw or kept stores. Moreover, staff arrived and left their worksta-
tion as they pleased. In consultation with his senior staff, Abdirazak
demanded that people arrive and stay at their stations for the full
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duration of the workday. Not surprisingly, once the new work ethic
was strictly enforced, many of the employees saw the new minister as
a monster bent on giving them an unnecessarily hard time. Word was
out in town that “Abdirazak burned staff at Interior and now was to
do the same in Public Works.” Nonetheless, Ali Sheikh and the more
professionally-oriented of the staff were pleased with the attitude of
the new minister. Within a week after taking office at Public Works,
Abdirazak turned to clean up his office. Morality was lax among many
Somali politicians, and the previous minister had six women working
in his front office. Rumor had it that he exploited these women subor-
dinates. When Abdirazak asked for an explanation as to what they did
in the office, the women responded by saying that they “served the
pleasure of the minister.” Only one of them was a typist, and a very
slow one at that, and spoke rudimentary Italian. Abdirazak told Ali
Sheikh that he did not want to fire any of these people so soon, but
instructed that they be found fitting employment elsewhere.
Ali Sheikh was a very busy professional. He had to travel frequently
in and outside of the country to keep an eye on the projects as well as
accompany official delegations. Although he had the full confidence of
his new Minister and the Prime Minister, Ali Sheikh never shook off
his own opposition to the regime. He decided to take early retirement
to protect his pension, once it became apparent that the integration of a
North-South salary scale might mean a reduction of income for
employees from the North. Since no appropriate replacement was
available, Ali Sheikh (like some other Northerners) was rehired on
contractual basis.
One of Abdirazak’s major accomplishments during his tenure in
Public Works that unequivocally marked his commitment to a national
rather than a regional or “clan” agenda was the establishment of
Somali Airlines. It is not clear whose idea it was to set up a national air-
line, the PM or the Minister. The PM and the Minister approached the
U.S. Ambassador and informed him of the country’s immense commu-
nication and transportation problems, i.e., long and unpaved roads
and the absence of air transport and railways. The two leaders specifi-
cally requested that the American government assist them in develop-
ing air transport. The Ambassador relayed the request to Washington
and returned with a positive answer for the Somalis. The American
offer was three completely reconditioned Dakota planes, each with a
capacity of 26 seats. Satisfied with the response, the PM delegated
Abdirazak and the Ambassador to finalize the agreement. Soon the
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issue came up of training pilots and ground crews for the incipient
venture. The Ambassador indicated that the United States could not
help in this regard. On his own initiative, Abdirazak approached the
West German Ambassador (who had already given generous logistical
support to the Somali Police Force), and requested that West Germany
assist Somalia by training Somali pilots and ground crews. The Ger-
mans reacted affirmatively within a week, with the only condition that
Germans set up the training program. The first key provisions of the
agreement were that the trainees be instructed in English and, there-
fore, must have a secondary school certificate from an English medium
school. Second, the Germans would conduct the examination to select
the trainees.
The Ministry immediately advertised 28 openings (for pilots,
mechanics, assistants, and other ground crew) on the national radio
and in the daily papers. Once the language conditions for the trainees
became public knowledge, many Southern politicians heavily criti-
cized the regime, and particularly Abdirazak, for favoring the North.
He had audiences with them and tried to persuade them that the Ger-
mans mandated the examination’s English requirement, and that he
could not go against this if the country was to make progress in civil
aviation. Moreover, he challenged them that there were Southerners
who had studied English in the Egyptian Secondary School and other
places and who should be able to compete for the posts. He warned
that regional or family favoritism had no place in the regime’s agenda,
and national advancement would only take place when every citizen
was given an equal opportunity. This was not sufficient to convince
the Southern regionalists.25
The Germans conducted the examination as planned, and, as it
turned out, all but two of the successful candidates were from the
North; the two Southerners were selected for the ground grew. As the
entire class flew to Germany to commence their studies, Abdirazak called on
Northern critics to take note of the merit-based competitive process for the
selection of the pilots — evidence that should fly in the face of the sectarian
rumors. He pointed out that had he been a regionalist, he would have auto-
matically approached the Italian Government to assist in aviation develop-
ment, a request that would have been met with enthusiasm. This would
have disqualified all potential Northern candidates. Although some of
the Northern critics recognized the fairness of the pilot selection
process, the general public, now so marooned in gossip and seduced
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by instrumentalist politicians, did not care enough to appreciate the
import of this event.
Another preoccupation of Abdirazak was curtailment of the theft of
state property, and the curbing of corruption. Private appropriation of
the ministry’s materials was glaring and could not be ignored. Ali
Sheikh, the best senior servant, took early retirement and there was no
other person with the same combination of skill and integrity. Conse-
quently, Abdirazak turned to another Northerner, his deputy governor
of Hargeisa. He requested from his colleague, the Minister, to appoint
Mr. Mohamed Jama Jengalee as the Director General of Public Works.
Jengalee, an efficient and honest administrator, moved quickly to clean
up the ministry under the watchful eye of Abdirazak. It was at this
time that he realized the magnitude of corruption in the apparatus of
the state. Some members of the cabinet were cognizant of this, but the
issue never came up as an agenda item in cabinet meetings. One of the
most visible manifestations of malfeasance was an alarming increase in
the number of expensive villas that state employees were constructing
and then renting to the diplomatic community. This habit had started
during the Italian Trusteeship Administration. For instance, Bank
Credito Somalo was created to mainly support farmers, but also, on a
smaller scale, to give credit to senior government officials to build their
own residences. One of the individuals who took legitimate advantage
of this was Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, who was a functionary of the
Administration. Abdirazak, as Vice-President of the Bank, could not
access this credit, as he was not a government employee. He had some
deposits in the Bank from his dual income and decided not to build a
house during his tenure in the two ministries. Most Somali officials
who built their houses through this scheme rented rather than lived in
them, as was required by the terms of the loans. Given the shortage of
decent housing in Mogadishu, these premises fetched a handsome
price from the expatriate community, a practice only to be increased
with independence. In due course, many politicians and civil servants
took advantage of their position to raid the public purse, construct a
coastal mansion, and lease it to expatriates for an exorbitant return.
Even Abdirashid had his old house rented and made a decent profit.
However, he was not a corrupt Prime Minister and, therefore, did not
gain wealth as a result of his position.
As a prominent minister, Abdirazak had many opportunities to
appropriate strategic plots of land in Mogadishu. All local govern-
ments in the country, including the capital city, came under the
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purview of the Ministry of Interior. He had only one plot of property
in Mogadishu that was vacant. It was this plot that attracted the most
curious interest from the American Embassy. One day, the American
Ambassador paid a visit to Abdirazak, during his days at Interior, to
discuss matters of concern to the Americans. Once these items were
concluded, the Ambassador shifted his attention to personal matters.
He informed Abdirazak that his plot overlooking the Indian Ocean
was nice property that the Embassy would be willing to develop with-
out any cost to him. In addition, the Embassy would occupy the new
building for five years after which the minister would take complete
ownership. Abdirazak was dumbfounded. Feeling caught off guard,
he asked the diplomat why the Embassy would want to do him this
favor and why not approach private business people like Yusuf Egal,
the entrepreneur who owned many parcels of land, including the com-
pound that housed the United Nations headquarters in Mogadishu. It
was now the Ambassador’s turn to be confounded, for the response
flew in the face of his hidden assumption that all African politicians
were on the take. But such a perspective was not unique to the United
States representatives. A few weeks later, the Italian petroleum com-
pany, Aggib, made a similar offer. The company director came to see
Abdirazak and asked if they could get permission from the Public
Lands Department to have a plot at a strategic intersection of the major
Mogadishu-Afgoi road to build a gasoline station. Aggib would build
the station but Abdirazak, as their titular agent, would share in the
profits. However, in order to consummate the deal, Aggib needed the
minister to use his authority to secure the permit from the Department
of Public Land, a unit of his ministry. To be sure, this was a lucrative
offer. But the cost was even greater—severe damage to the integrity of
his office and the professional judgment of the staff. Aggib’s director
was dismayed by the rejection, but took the offer to Abdikadir Zoppo,
the Minister of Finance. Zoppo jumped at the opportunity and made
substantial money from the affair, particularly after 1967 when he no
longer held a ministerial appointment.26
These were fantastically corrupting opportunities, but Abdirazak
bucked the prevailing political impulses of the time. There is no doubt
that he could have had any piece of land in Mogadishu during his
tenure at Interior and then build the property with Public Works
resources, when he was head of that ministry. Abdirazak belonged to a
different breed of politician. His resolute self-monitoring in that hon-
eymoon-like morrow of the new state when painless but unlawful
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seductions were abundant; his scrupulousness toward the office and
the morals of his staff; and his admiration as well as concrete support
for competent senior servants, many of them from the North, testified
to his developing national reputation as one-of-a-kind. Added together,
Abdirazak’s perspective captured, and preceded by nearly three decades, what
is nowadays proffered as the only solution to Africa’s troubles: good gover-
nance. From Abdirazak’s point of view, the Italian Administration was
singularly responsible for normalizing corruption in the South. Keen
on winning Somali clients to its side, the Italian Trusteeship was a time
of heightened political favoritism and venality—practices corrosive of
managerial adroitness and, eventually, toxic to civic dedication. This
was the enveloping culture faced by many honest Southern public
administrators. An upshot of this context, for the immediate post-inde-
pendence period, was the standardization of a disconnect among the
state elite between their oath of office and the exploitation of that pub-
lic authority for quick private gain. With such behavior increasingly
flaunted, rank and file public servants were bound to join the fray.
Abdirazak’s concern over the magnitude of corruption, given the
aforementioned incidents and what he heard from many others, drove
him to write a confidential report on the subject just before the first
post-independence elections. The report warned the PM that the state
could not afford to ignore the scope of the problem and that the regime
should take a strong stand against this abuse after the election. The
report specifically named four incompetent and fundamentally cor-
rupt members of the cabinet. Copies of this confidential report were
submitted to President Aden, and the two commanders of the military
and police forces, Generals Daud and Abshir, respectively.
Abdirazak’s tenure in Public Works lasted from 1962 to the 1964
election. Shortly after he took charge of the ministry, his old physical
ailment resurfaced. A few weeks later, he started coughing blood and
became seriously ill. A specialist, brought from Italy by the PM, gave
him a thorough examination. After the bloody coughing had been
halted, the doctor discovered that one of Abdirazak’s lungs had a hole.
It was recommended that he urgently be evacuated to the U.S.A., the
country with the best medical facilities for his condition. Abdirazak
was airlifted to Washington, D.C.’s Walter Reed Hospital. Shortly
after, the American Ambassador wrote to the PM and told him that the
U.S. government would pay for all the medical expenses in Washing-
ton. Abdirashid acknowledged the offer and thanked him. Abdirazak
was under observation and medication during March and April, 1963.
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Finally, his damaged lung was removed on May 3, and he left the hos-
pital two weeks later. He remained in Washington for further treat-
ment and observation until his return to Somalia in June.
President Aden had cultivated a reputation for unwavering abid-
ance by the word and spirit of the Constitution. He became a national
symbol and as such stayed out of party politics. Unlike many of his
African peers, he tried not to intrude into the prerogatives of the exec-
utive PM. Often, he received a lot of complaints from the public. If he
thought these accusations had merit, he would call the minister con-
cerned or the PM. If an issue was of particular salience, he would write
to the PM and counsel him to give it due attention. Aden wrote a few
such letters to Abdirashid, which the latter disregarded.27 These devel-
opments began to create a communication gap, which would become a
problem between the two leaders later on. For Abdirashid, the Presi-
dent’s proddings were tantamount to a breach of the constitutional
division of labor between president and prime minister.
For some time, the Somali state had been requesting support for
building its military from the West. This was turned down after sev-
eral years of sustained effort. Finally, the PM turned to the Soviets and
found a more sympathetic superpower. The commander of the mili-
tary, General Daud A. Hersi, was assigned to represent the regime in
the final negotiations in Moscow and then sign the agreement. This
was happening while Abdirazak was in Washington for his operation.
Western diplomats pressed hard on the PM to drop the agreement
with the Soviets, and General Abshir of the Police, among others, was
approached to convince him to do so. Finally, Western diplomats
called upon Abdirazak to change the PM’s mind, but he told them that
they came too late. Many suspected that Abdirazak was pro-American
given his recent treatment in Washington and the assistance he got
from the State Department. When he returned, the PM told him that
Western diplomats had lobbied with every member of the cabinet and,
consequently, he was concerned about how this important issue would
fare in the next meeting of the cabinet. Abdirazak suggested that the
PM could not go back on the agreement and that the discussion should
go forth. Abdirazak took the initiative to lead the deliberations in the
cabinet, which ended with unanimous support for the agreement.
From then on, Western diplomats and governments depicted the PM
as leftist.
As the first post-independence election approached, the govern-
ment began broadcasting electoral procedures and rules over the two
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national radio stations.28 Suddenly, the first Somali-Ethiopian war
broke out in early 1964. The PM was in the town of Qardho when hos-
tilities began. Once the news reached him, he wired Abdirazak, who
was submitting his candidacy application in his constituency in
Garowe. The PM picked him up en route to Mogadishu, using Heen
Finiin, the police plane. Abdirashid addressed the nation with the now
famous line, “We will vote with one hand and fight with the other.”29
Sudan mediated between the two countries and hostilities died down.
Although Ethiopia had superior military hardware and its troops were
better trained, the Somalis held their own despite many civilian casual-
ties. Many of the latter were volunteers who took it upon themselves to
help defend their country.
The election took place during the war and the SYL won a majority
of the 123 seats in parliament. The relations between the President and
the PM were cool, although members of parliament and the cabinet
were not aware of this. Two issues separated the two leaders. First,
President Aden could not close his eyes to a rising kleptocratic ten-
dency among politicians and public servants nor to the consequent
public disillusionment. Second, as the West applied pressure on every-
one regarding the Somali-Soviet agreement, the President advised the
PM to weigh the matter carefully. The PM may have interpreted the
President’s cautious approach as a signal of his pro-Western leanings.
By the conclusion of the election, they were estranged from each other.
As was expected, new and triumphant MPs rushed to Mogadishu
where they descended on Abdirashid’s home and office in search of
portfolios. Everyone, including Abdirazak, assumed that the President
would renominate Abdirashid. Given how close the PM and Abdi-
razak were, the latter decided not to join the stampede. But while this
crowding was going on, the PM and Abdirazak drove to Afgoi for an
outing. It was on this occasion that the PM shared his differences with
the President, differences strong enough to possibly rule him out for
renomination. Abdirashid urged his friend to accept if the President
invited him instead. Moreover, he warned that to decline such an invi-
tation would open the way for Mohamed Ibrahim Egal or Abdillahi
Issa, two men Abdirashid was convinced would ill-serve the country
at that point in time. Abdirazak replied that there was no reason for
Aden to appoint him, particularly given the precariousness of his
health and the instructions of his doctors. In addition, he tried to con-
vince his friend that the differences between him and the President
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were minor and that, above all, Aden was a man known for his direct-
ness and rectitude.
The first act of the new parliament was the selection of its officers,
but the entire city was already gripped by speculation about whom
Abdirashid would select to his cabinet. Such preoccupations were
partly due to Somalia’s democratic fervor and the assumption that
Abdirashid would continue to lead the new regime. Abdirazak began
to distance himself from the electioneering process when Ahmed
Sheikh, from Berbera, was nominated to the presidency of the new
parliament. Ahmed Sheikh, according to Abdirazak, had a terrible rep-
utation and his character was fundamentally flawed. This signaled to
Abdirazak that the old corrupt MPs were directing things, despite the
arrival of a number of new and more educated young MPs. Abdirazak
followed his earlier memo on corruption with another one. Sent to the
recipients of the first, Abdirazak knew that picking up the issue of cor-
ruption at that moment would seem a different campaign. Though the
PM and Abdirazak met in cabinet discussions during this transition
period, it was clear that their political intimacy was on the wane — a
development underscored by the lack of private meetings between
them. Those who wanted to push out Abdirazak, and his friend
Zoppo, planted stories intended to marginalize them. Abdirazak’s
absence from the nomination and election processes of parliament,
combined with the lack of visitations during the electioneering
onslaught, had convinced the PM that his friend and Zoppo had not
been loyal of late.30 Abdirazak claims that he remained supportive of
the PM, reservations about the post-election campaign for cabinet
posts notwithstanding.
Meanwhile, the President began his consultations with different
constituencies in order to select a PM. He met members of all legiti-
mate groups, including many self-invited MPs and others who were
eager to offer their unsolicited opinions. The President then dropped a
political bombshell. One afternoon, after Abdirazak came home from
work, he noticed a pink envelope on his desk. Pink envelopes were
used for official mail only, and he noticed the stamp of the presidency.
The letter instructed him to come to the president’s office at a desig-
nated hour on the next day. Once he finished reading the note, he rec-
ognized what this meant, since he knew that Abdirashid had received
a similar letter four years earlier. Abdirazak called Abdirashid and
asked if he could see him. He met Abdirashid at his home and showed
him the letter. Abdirashid congratulated his old friend but their body
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language was stiff and not what it used to be. Abdirazak asked him
why he thought (during that earlier outing to Afgoi) that he might be
selected by the President. The PM responded by saying that he was
among the strongest of the cadres and that he was qualified to take up
the post. Abdirashid then added that he must accept the nomination.
After a while, the conversation petered out and Abdirazak left the
house with mixed feelings.
Abdirazak met the President at the appointed hour. Aden shared
with him the wide consultation he had had regarding the state of the
nation and the essential qualities of a new PM. Without expressing
direct criticism of Abdirashid, the President conveyed his decision not
to renominate the PM.31 Aden stressed that the naming of the PM was
the only occasion on which the President had a direct hand in the
administration of the affairs of the state. As a result, the best way to
heed his oath of office was to stick to what he thought to be in the
interest of the country. Abdirazak reminded the President of his ill
health, as well as his unpopular reputation at Interior. The President
retorted by telling him about how many of those, particularly in the
North, who were critical of him at Interior, had since recanted their
negative opinions. Aden finally asserted pithily that “Somali rageyga ha
kala barato” (Let Somalis learn to distinguish between their leaders).
Abdirazak suggested that he should give Abdirashid a second chance,
to which the President replied that he was not willing to experiment
with his deeply held convictions. Abdirazak thanked the President for
his consideration but declared that he could not accept the honor.
Aden inquired whether his feelings had something to do with the fact
that his cousin was not reappointed. In the end, Aden told him to take
a day to think about the challenge. When Abdirazak returned to his
residence, General Abshir paid an unexpected visit, apparently
encouraged by the President to convince the minister to accept his new
appointment. Once the politicians heard about Abdirazak’s nomina-
tion, they moved from Abdirashid’s home/office to the new center of
gravity. After another day of an extended deadline, Abdirazak
accepted the nomination and moved forward to form his cabinet.
V. Sweet and Sour Times: Premiership of the Second Republic
The Prime Minister-Designate had these critical tasks on his plate, and
in this order: cabinet selection and a parliamentary vote of confidence;
public service reform; corruption; and preparation for the next presi-
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dential election. Before going any further, however, Abdirazak called
on his departing chief, Abdirashid, to both seek advice and invite him
to join the new regime by choosing any portfolio. Abdirashid declined
and added that he couldn’t see himself being sworn in by President
Aden. It dawned on Abdirazak there and then that the relationship
between Aden and Abdirashid had deteriorated, perhaps, to a point of
no political return. With sadness in his heart, Abdirazak started a
process of extensive consultations, including many individuals in the
public at large and almost all the members of the new parliament. Gen-
eral Daud A. Hersi paid a visit to warn and offer counsel on what he
saw as the prevalence of a heightened clanist feeling in the country. In
contrast, many others came on their own accord either to jostle for
posts or to dissuade the Prime Minister-Designate from appointing
their competitors. For instance, a delegation from Upper Jubba32 visited
to impress upon him that he should not appoint Abdikadir Zoppo, one
of their own, as a minister, as they accused him of only looking after
his interests. Some even hinted that he was a criminal, referring to the
murder of Kamal al-Din. Earlier, during his consultative conversa-
tions, university educated Somalis complained to him about the politi-
cal domination of un/undereducated old politicians. Subsequently, he
called a secret meeting of these critics, among them individuals such as
Dr. Hassan Ali Mireh, Ahmed Silaanyo, and Abdirahman Noor Hersi.
They met at the seaside residence of Yusuf Egal, a wealthy merchant.
Abdirazak challenged them to come up with a list of possible nomi-
nees that would gain the Parliament’s vote of confidence. After two
days of debates, they recognized the main political dilemma faced by
the PM-Designate in selecting his new cabinet: talent versus regional
representation. Abdirazak’s ambition was to both curb the size of the
cabinet and select as many of the younger and more educated MPs to
ministerial posts as possible. While the latter became an impossibility
due, in part, to intensive political pressure, he was able to make head-
way in the first. As it turned out, a disproportionate number happened to be
from the North, a result of his commitment to look for potential high perfor-
mance rather than a political calculation to privilege Northerners.33
The President endorsed the list of selected ministers and they were
sworn in. Abdirazak then presented his cabinet and his program to
Parliament. Many MPs were only interested in who was selected and
paid no attention to the program. As the roll was called, opposition
and government supporters stood even at sixty each. (Abdirashid
voted with the opposition.) The last name to be called was Mr. Ali
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Mohamed Hirabe, a former minister and a member of the opposition.
He said “yes” first but quickly retracted and cast a negative vote. Gov-
ernment supporters tried to contest the retraction, but the PM-Desig-
nate intervened. Abdirazak spoke to the chamber and said, “My
friend, Ali, was pro-Italian during the Trusteeship, then he joined SYL,
became a minister in the previous government, and then I removed
him from that post. He has been a ‘yes man’ all his life, and his chance
to say ‘no’ today was betrayed by his ‘yes’ habit. Since my govern-
ment’s fate depends on his vote, I want the President of the Chamber
to count Ali’s vote as negative, so he could be liberated today.” The
public in the gallery cheered and even opposition members joined in.
All of Abdirashid’s ministers, except Abdikadir Zoppo and Abdillahi
Issa who were in the new cabinet, casted a vote of confidence; many
others decided to oppose as they felt slighted or because their competi-
tors from the same constituency had been appointed. Most Northern
delegates voted in support of the new government. The public crafted
a joke to humor those who were or were not in a new cabinet. “Former
ministers came early in the morning as if to catch their ride, expecting
to be picked up by Abdirazak. Abdirazak came late and he only found
Abdillahi Issa, who usually stayed late at night and slept until mid-
morning, and Zoppo ‘the crippled,’ whom it took a longer time to get
there.” This, they jested, is how Abdirazak picked his cabinet.
Abdirashid did not come out openly to oppose the new regime but
worked behind the scenes to convey his displeasure. Yusuf Egal, Abdi-
rashid’s ally, invited the two men to dinner to help patch up their
friendship. Abdirazak offered Abdirashid, once again, whatever cabi-
net post he desired. But the former Prime Minister was in no mood for
such niceties. Instead, he expressed his anger over some of the contents
of Abdirazak’s first public speech on Radio Mogadishu in which he
associated, Abdirashid claimed, the former regime with corrupt and
clannish ways. Abdirazak contested this and asserted that his written
and oral speech specifically promised to attempt to curb corruption. A
second meeting was arranged between the two, but they made no
progress in bridging the gulf. From then on, Abdirashid was firmly in
the opposition. He rarely attended parliamentary sessions. He spent
his days on Lido beach reading Italian novels and making rare appear-
ances in Parliament to cast a crucial vote. At Lido, he was visited by
disgruntled MPs.
Abdirazak went back to the presidency to deliver his resignation
after the rejection by Parliament. He advised the President to rethink in
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order to avoid another loss. Unvexed, the President sent another pink
envelope to Abdirazak. Abdirazak accepted the designation but con-
vened a meeting of the SYL Central Committee to get its endorsement
before forming a new cabinet and submitting it to Parliament. Some
members accused him of betraying Abdirashid, but the majority, after
a week-long debate and through a secret ballot, gave its blessing.
Moreover, and memorably, Mohamoud Issa Jama, the Minister of
Agriculture-Designate in the failed attempt, offered to vacate his post
so that more Southerners could be accommodated. He thought such a
gesture might mollify many Southern MPs who were upset by the fact
that Northerners were given disproportionately more cabinet seats in
Abdirazak’s first government. In his second attempt, a majority of MPs
voted to support Abdirazak’s regime and its unchanged program.
Reforming the civil service was an issue long in need of attention.
The U.N.-assisted public service commission, set up in 1960, produced
its final report in early 1964. Since Abdirashid’s regime and the coun-
try were preoccupied with the first Ethiopian-Somali war and the
forthcoming election, the report was set aside for the duration of those
engagements. The new PM focused on the report immediately and
informed the Commissioners that they need not be overly concerned
about its political implications, as that was his responsibility. He
impressed on them that their sole concern should be how to create an
effective public service. In this context, Abdirazak recalled Mohamed
Burraleh, a highly reputed administrator, from his consular post in
Moscow and appointed him as the new Director General of Personnel.
Burraleh was not happy losing his diplomatic post, but took on the dif-
ficult assignment with a sense of loyalty and purposefulness.
When the Commission unveiled its work, with an accent on the
quantity and quality of personnel needed for the next decade, it
stressed that numerous state employees, particularly in senior posi-
tions, had neither the experience nor the qualifications necessary for
their posts. It was recommended that such individuals should be given
two years, with salary, to re-qualify through training. Those who failed
to capitalize on the opportunity ought to be discharged. The cabinet
accepted the report and Abdirazak gave orders for its strict implemen-
tation. Each ministry was then required to look into its section of the
report and deal with the recommendations accordingly. Many minis-
ters were hesitant to face the unpleasant task of demoting and firing
staff, but Abdirazak reminded them that he would take full responsi-
bility for the fallout, but that each one must act with firmness.
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The Prime Minister had his own list of senior employees whom he
suspected of exploiting their position for self-enrichment or passing
confidential state information to foreign interests. He asked the police
and his staff to investigate these people, who found out that many on
the list were involved in illegal activities. Finally, when nearly 200
senior officials were earmarked for redundancy (Posta Rossa), many
were afforded an opportunity to enhance their qualifications. One of
the ministries hit hard was Finance. All but two of the discharged
senior staff were from the South, including a second cousin of the PM.
Abdirazak knew him as a former SYL Central Committee member as
well as his immediate superior in his days at the Signal Corps. Soon
after joining Finance, this gentleman acquired numerous properties in
the Capital. But Abdirazak’s campaign did not even spare his older brother, 
a lowly employee who was among the nearly 600 non-senior staff terminated
as part of the reform process. The majority of this group, too, was from the
South.
Parliament was in session when the reforms were announced, and
most MPs criticized these actions, with some interpreting them as acts
of revenge or sheer cruelty. Abdirashid was among the critics and
thought that the decision was extreme. In defense of the reform pro-
gram, Abdirazak pointed out that three types of employees were tar-
geted for dismissal: the corrupt, the incompetent, and individuals
engaged in leaking national security information. Surprising enough,
none of the critics in Parliament accused the PM of “clan” favoritism.
Later on, Egal’s regime (1967 – 68) rehired nearly all the major figures
dismissed. The latter raised 200,000 shillings for Abdirashid’s presi-
dential campaign.
The establishment of a Public Service Commission created new
dynamics in the service. It began to systematically evaluate govern-
ment employees on a regular basis, creating transparent and pre-
dictable procedures for promotion and demotions. Slowly, the
insulation of this process from political manipulation became appar-
ent. Ironically, many young educated Somalis who had earlier
assumed that they would quickly rise to the top of the civil service
began to feel that the new regime would require not only qualifications
but, in addition, experience and performance for promotion. The case
of Abdirahman Noor Hersi was an instantiation of inflated expecta-
tions and subsequent disappointments. Hersi had recently graduated
from Columbia University, with a Masters degree in economics. Abdi-
razak was approached soon after he was appointed PM and asked to
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retire the Italian head of the Central Bank and to replace him with
Hersi, who held a mid-level position at the Bank. The PM rejected this
request and Mr. Hersi, one of the young educated men the PM had ear-
lier challenged to identify a cabinet that would gain approval from
Parliament to no avail, was dismayed by Abdirazak’s stance. There
were many similar instances across the bureaucracy.
An imprint of the new regime was respect for the independence of
the Public Service Commission, which was given the task of reviewing
all promotions and demotions of civil servants. Two instances high-
light the professional protection the Commission afforded civil ser-
vants, even when the later engaged in transgressions, as well as the
regime’s readiness to abide by its rules. First is the case of Yusuf Dirir
from Burao. Dalka, the late Yusuf Dhuhul’s independent monthly mag-
azine,34 was popular among the educated Somalis. It had a monthly
article that was usually very critical of the regime and whose author
seemed to have access to classified state information. An investigation
was conducted to determine the identity of the author and the source.
Dirir, an economics graduate from a British university, was a consular
in the Somali Embassy in Addis Ababa. It was discovered that he was
the culprit and had used the diplomatic bag to transmit the articles to
his friends in Foreign Affairs, who passed it to the editor of Dalka. The
Minister of Foreign Affairs finally decided to intercept, and opened the
suspected envelope without a warrant, only to discover an article des-
tined for Dalka with Dirir’s signature. Dirir was summoned to
Mogadishu. He stridently argued that the Minister had no right to
open his private letter, although he himself had no explanation for the
wrongful use of the diplomatic pouch. The Ministry accused him of
illegal use of state service and the publishing of confidential informa-
tion. The case was submitted to the Public Service Commission, with a
demand that Dirir be dismissed. After some careful deliberations, the
Commission reprimanded Dirir rather than discharging him. Under-
standably disappointed, the regime, nonetheless, complied.
The second episode dealt with the curbing of corruption and the
enhancement of democratic rule. One of Abdirazak’s first edicts for his
cabinet was that each one declare and register his or her private assets
and wealth.35 This had two primary purposes. First, it was intended to
impress on the public that the regime was serious about its anti-cor-
ruption program and that its ministers were expected to be account-
able, and, secondly, that the cabinet understood that they were being
particularly watched to insure that none of them was engaged in ille-
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gal wealth accumulation. Soon, several were fired. Most conspicuous,
perhaps, was Osman Mohamed Cadde, the Minister of Commerce.
Abdirazak had known Cadde since the 1950s when the latter was
inspector of prisons and the former had been an inmate in Mogadishu.
In addition, Cadde was a distant cousin. Abdirazak was informed that
Cadde was blocking the usual importation of tea in order for his clients
to exploit the artificially induced shortage. Not eager to act on the basis
of rumors, he summoned Cadde to his office and asked him about the
veracity of the talk of the town. Cadde denied the allegations, but the
PM asked the police to investigate the matter. The police discovered
that Cadde and his client, a first cousin of Abdirazak, were directly
involved in manipulating tea importation by using the state’s Trading
Agency. Once the conclusive report was in his hands, Abdirazak
signed a decree sacking Cadde and Ismail Dualeh, Minister at Agricul-
ture, found guilty of another equally damning act of malfeasance with
regard to banned charcoal exports.
Dualeh came pleading and, given the decades of acquaintance
between him and Abdirazak, the response was both humorous and
biting. The PM told Dualeh that people in Hargeisa had already
dubbed him “Dhul cun” (land eater) during his governorship, because
of his corrupt land practices. Now, as Minister of Agriculture, the pub-
lic dubbed him “Dhir cun” (forest eater), from a general awareness of
his kickbacks operation authorizing the export of banned forest prod-
ucts. In jest, the PM told Dualeh that this was a preemptive act before
Dualeh became “Dad cun” (people eater)!36 A third dismissed minister
was the Christian Somali, James, of Finance. In this case, the national
audit discovered that James illegally used 300,000 shillings from the
Postal Bank in Burao for his election campaign in 1963–4. Since the dis-
missed ministers and deputy ministers retained their parliamentary
seats and the concurrent immunity, further prosecution could only
proceed with that protection lifted.37 A formal request to that effect was
delivered to the President of the Parliament, but to no avail. The oppo-
sition manipulated parliamentary rules, with the tacit consent of the
President, since all those under fire had immediately joined the ranks
of the opposition. Even though the President of Parliament, from Bay-
dhabo, was elected with Abdirazak’s support, he sympathized with
the opposition and, therefore, kept the regime’s request at the bottom
of the agenda. Consequently, individuals accused of fraudulent
actions were saved in the cocooned chambers of Parliament and within
the flanks of the opposition.
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VI. The Presidential Election of 1967: A Historic Turning Point
A myriad serious concerns came onto the radar screen in the life of
Abdirazak’s regime. Among these were the forthcoming independence
referendum in French Somaliland and the management of relations
with Ethiopia and Kenya. But none would prove more crucial than the
approaching presidential election. We have not been able to trace any
evidence to suggest that the President and the Prime Minister hatched
or even discussed a plan to subvert the election in order to ensure the
former’s reelection. On the contrary, there is enough testimony to sus-
tain that they treated it as a routine and constitutionally guided demo-
cratic exercise. Such an absence of high anxiety is surprising given that
both the President and the Premier knew that the public misunder-
stood Aden and a significant number of MPs disliked him. Four issues
underscored Aden’s low popularity with many parliamentarians: his
refusal to offer personal favors to many MPs who sought such help; his
strict adherence to the constitutional division of labor between Presi-
dent and Prime Minister; his brutal frankness in telling things as he
saw them; and his indifference to his reelection campaign. Aden’s
reluctance to seek a second term was known to many. Some distin-
guished MPs such as Ibrahim Oonlaayeh, Hiloole Maalin, Mohamed
Abdi Noor, and Mohamed Ali Dhooreh conclaved with the President
and urged him to actively run as he was the most appropriate leader
for the country at the time. The group sensed Aden’s diffidence and
prompted Abdirazak to exhort Aden to seek reelection, but Abdirazak
responded that he could not impose such a wish on Aden.
The Prime Minister invited Egal for dinner just before the SYL’s
annual conference in 1967, and declared that he was not interested in
the Premiership after his term ended, and that Egal, as a most promi-
nent member of Parliament, had a good chance for leadership if he
joined the Party. Egal heeded the advice and the Prime Minister intro-
duced him at the annual meeting where he was nominated and voted
in as a member. In his acceptance speech, Egal remarked, half jokingly,
that many in the house would assume that he was joining the party
solely to realize his political ambition.
The SYL convened its annual meeting in Mogadishu several months
before the election, and the first issue it dealt with was to appoint a
new party chief. In the past, neither the Party’s president nor its secre-
tary general had become head of government. Despite Abdirazak’s
resistance, the Party changed its rules and approved that the Prime
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Minister would, from now on, become also the leader of the Party.
Abdirazak stressed the importance of keeping the management of the
Party’s affairs and that of the regime separate to maintain autonomy
on both sides. But he was alone in his dissension and the motion
passed. Next, the Party’s attention shifted to the election. Some of the
members, mostly Abdirashid’s backers, vilified Aden and accused him
of all sorts of things, but Aden’s supporters outnumbered the critics,
and the Party, through secret ballot, endorsed him as the SYL candi-
date. Abdirashid, who refused to attend the Party Congress, was told
that he could not run on the Party’s platform. His response was terse
and defiant.
Campaigning started as the election date approached. Abdirashid
openly plunged into the fray and began making advance promises to
MPs to consolidate their support. Most significantly, he offered the
premiership to Egal who accepted the pledge. Shortly afterwards, Egal
invited Abdirazak and, over a meal, informed him that he was not cer-
tain that Aden would appoint him and, therefore, he had opted for the
guarantee from Abdirashid (strange that Egal never thought of run-
ning for the presidency!). Aden could not make such a promise to Egal
or anyone else since he considered such horse-trading cheap and irre-
sponsible. Many MPs visited the President, anticipating that he would
lobby them for his reelection and seduce them with offers of money or
posts in the future regime. They left such meetings disappointed, as
Aden would often urge them to vote for him only if they considered
him to be the appropriate candidate. In contrast, Abdirashid’s cam-
paign developed this slogan on the basis of Aden’s approach to the
election: Why vote for someone who does not want your support; vote for the
candidate who begs for it.
Aden did not actively lobby for reelection. Consequently, it fell to
Abdirazak and his cabinet to take responsibility for mobilizing sup-
port in Parliament. A large number of parliamentarians were oblivious
to the issue at stake in the presidential election, and were simply dri-
ven by their appetite for money or a ministerial post. For many of these
MPs, this was not a contest between ideas, the records of the two can-
didates, or competing national agendas. On the contrary, their vote
became a commodity, plain and simple, to be sold to the highest bid-
der and without the sanctity of a commercial/legal contract. In other
words, any promise had a momentary shelf life and was subject to an
incessant bidding war. Abdirashid’s campaign deployed cash induce-
ment, offers of ministerial and other positions, and protection from
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prosecution for seven MPs accused of high level corruption. The for-
mer Finance Minister, James, was an example of those promised refuge
from justice. James sent emissaries to Abdirazak to the effect that, in
his heart, he preferred to vote for Aden as he disliked Abdirashid, but
needed assurance that he would retain his parliamentary immunity.
Abdirazak ignored James’ request and, by default, lost the votes of the
seven MPs targeted for prosecution.
In addition to cash handouts drawn from the ordinary discretionary
funds of Interior and the Premier’s special fund, Abdirazak authorized
an additional 200,000 shillings to keep pace. Nonetheless, the regime
suspected that the opposition had a bigger war chest, primarily
through support from the Eastern Bloc, particularly the Soviets, and
the Italian Communist Party for Abdirashid and the Greater League.
(Abdirashid had toured the U.S.S.R., Germany, Italy, and Egypt prior
to the campaign). Moreover, the opposition’s fortunes rose substan-
tially due to the regime’s untimely diplomatic blunder. A short while
before the election, North Korea, in search of strategic advantage in the
Horn of Africa, sought diplomatic recognition from Somalia. North
Korea sent and maintained a delegation in Mogadishu that put enor-
mous and persistent pressure on the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Ahmed Yusuf Dualeh. He gave in and told Abdirazak that he had
promised recognition and that the announcement was scheduled for
soon after the election. In addition, Dualeh took the delegation to see
Abdirazak. Once the American diplomats found out about the meet-
ing, they doubled their commitment to support the opposition. Their
discomfort with Abdirashid as a presidential candidate notwithstand-
ing, the American envoys were satisfied with his partnership with Egal
and, most importantly, the designation of the latter as Premier in the
event of victory. The Political Officer in the U.S. Embassy organized
several elaborate social gatherings and many MPs were invited. The
paradox here was that most Western diplomats and governments
(especially West Germany), who were satisfied with the regime’s com-
mitment to improved administration and democratic practice, turned
away from Abdirazak once America declared its preference.
A further liability for the Abdirazak regime was the unwillingness
to accommodate particularistic political demands. Characteristic of
intraparliamentary politics, members who came from the same regions
or electoral districts competed for the same ministerial posts and other
scarce resources. Each tried to outmaneuver the other and failing that,
each attempted to deny the other any post. The only acceptable sce-
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nario was if both MPs gained some similar appointment or none (a
zero sum affair). Once one became a minister, the other joined the
opposition. For instance, Abdirazak thought highly of his minister at
Interior, Zoppo, as an effective administrator. Juujeh, who was also
from the same region, had to be accommodated as minister without
portfolio in order to keep the Upper Jubba deputies on the regime’s
side. In the end, the entire Upper Jubba delegation, with the exception
of two members, asserted that they would support Aden’s presidency
if Abdirazak promised them that Zoppo would not be a minister in his
future cabinet. Abdirazak responded that he was in no position to
make such a pledge since he was not interested in the Premiership and,
more relevantly, had no idea whether Aden would even reappoint
him. He added that they should only come to him if Zoppo had in any
way abused his position at Interior in order to punish his competitors
or political foes. The delegation never took up the challenge, but many
voted for Abdirashid to seal Zoppo’s political fate. Juujeh, the Minister
of Agriculture and one of the men who tried to convince Aden to seek
reelection, had secretly agreed with Egal to vote for Abdirashid. A
member of the Upper Jubba delegates, Gaaytano, informed Abdirazak
that Juujeh had tried to convince him to support Abdirashid. Egal,
apparently, had asked Juujeh to deliver Gaaytano’s vote. Incidentally,
Abdirashid and Juujeh had been foes since Abdirashid’s premiership
years. In the end, Juujeh voted for Abdirashid and was appointed min-
ister in the Egal regime, only to be fired shortly thereafter. Another
case was that of Aden Issaq of Borama and Minister of Defense.
Although known for his administrative capabilities, he was engaged in
double-dealing and he worried about the possibility of his fellow dis-
trict MP, Abdi Hassan Booni, overtaking him. His conspicuous and
proactive campaigning for Aden was belied by his betrayal when it
mattered: he voted for Abdirashid and retained his ministerial post in
the Egal regime.
The appointed hour had arrived, and candidate Abdirashid and all
other members of Parliament came to the venue. Aden was at his offi-
cial residence, since he was not entitled to vote. The constitution stipu-
lated that a candidate for the presidency must gain a two-thirds
majority in the first and second ballot, and an absolute majority in sub-
sequent ones.38 Two ballots were discarded, as the writing on them was
illegible. Abdirashid won the first and second ballots by one vote (his
own). On the third ballot, several MPs switched their support to Abdi-
rashid, who received nearly seventy votes out of 123. When victory
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was announced by the President of the Parliament, a deputy from Eyl
held up his pencil and declared with trepidation, “Fidmow kow” (First
trouble!).
VII. Conclusion
Ali Said Arraleh, one of the first Director Generals from the North, has
had this to say about the leadership quality of President Aden and Pre-
mier Abdirazak thirty-four years after they left office:
Aden was so strict with the taxpayers’ money that he saved enough from
the presidency annual budget to build a presidential retreat in Afgoi
while others were pocketing public money. Abdirazak’s respect for the
law and his anti-corruption effort has no parallel in our history. His
hands are absolutely untainted and the two are peerless as Somali politi-
cal leaders.39
Aden and Abdirazak lost, in hindsight, what was the major water-
shed in Somalia’s modern social and political history. According to the
latter, about 70 percent of Aden’s supporters were rock solid. But a
combination of MPs accused of corruption, several turncoat ministers,
and Upper Jubba deputies shifted the balance of politics in favor of a
current that has yet to run its full course. The behavior of ministers
who betrayed their own regime for personal interests, those accused of
malfeasance but sought cover in parliamentary immunity, and, not the
least, the front bench of the opposition whose main tactic of promising
state privilege in exchange for votes vulgarized both the cultivation
and conduct of leadership and signaled the triumph of instrumentalist
politics.
Abdirazak was confronted with a Hobson’s choice: ignore the con-
spicuous abuse of office by some of his ministers or surrender to the
politics of fortuna and blackmail. Either option would have immedi-
ately destroyed his precious attribute as a reformer and, furthermore
and in the last instance, would most likely have come up against the
constitutional rectitude of President Osman. The old Somali pastoral
saying could not be more apt: “Haddii aan hadlana, waa aaf salax kula
dhagayee; haddii kalana, bal Ilaahay siduu xoolaha ku hayo daaya” (If I utter
a complaint, my mouth is instantly sealed; If I keep silent, Allah’s pun-
ishment of the realm is unabated).
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Thoughtful and caring Somalis have every reason to hold Abdi-
razak’s and Aden’s combined contributions as exemplary of what
courageous and noble spirit mean. Their clairvoyance to discern what
was imperative for a different and more enabling future, coupled with
a resolute belief in the necessity of constitutional practice to the mak-
ing of a mature political community, are inspiring for Somali and
African time, desperate for both. 
Notes
*A significant part of this research relies on scores of hours of conversations with Pre-
mier Abdirazak H. Hussein between 2000 – 2001. We are indebted to Abdirazak’s gen-
erosity to not only share with us his experiences but his willingness to entertain, with
utmost candidness and open-mindedness, numerous and counterintuitive questions we
posed to him in the course of the research.
1. We have identified a heuristic typology of current and ineffective Somali actors: (a)
crippled nationalists; (b) Potemkin regionalists; and (c) scavenging warlords. The first
holds on to honorable pan-Somali sensibilities but is unable to articulate them into full,
concrete, galvanizing ideas; the second imagines ethnic localism, one that sponsors an
exaggerated regional distinctiveness as a justification for new and self-serving centrifu-
gal dispensation; and the third, reminiscent of pirates, has little allegiance to anyone
beyond those who gather around him to loot whatever is left of the commons, as well as
threaten those who refuse to capitulate with hatred and direct violence. While the first is
a noble but tragic individual, the other two, though different, typify the general debility
that accompanies “smallness,” a condition that, in Jad Rubenfeld’s expression, “ . . . is the
refuge of those who cannot bear the large responsibility for living over time, the respon-
sibility of what they have been and will be.” Jad Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of
Constitutional Government (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), p. 16. We intend to
elaborate on this typology in the fullness of our volume that is in progress.
2. See, for instance, Samatar and Samatar, eds., The State in Africa: Reconsiderations
(Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 2002).
3. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963), p. 81.
4. Op. Cit.
5. Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957).
6. This section relies heavily on Abdirazak’s own recollections.
7. “Moment” is used here in a mode akin to Henri Lefebvre’s sense. It is a situation,
according to David Harvey, to be “interpreted as fleeting but decisive sensations (of
delight, surrender, disquiet, surprise, horror, or outrage) which were somehow revela-
tory of the totality of possibilities contained in daily existence. ‘Moments’ [could be] con-
ceived of as points of rupture, of radical recognition of possibilities and intense
euphoria.” David Harvey, “Afterward” in Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 429.
8. Founding members of SYL were Abdiqaadir Shakhaawa Diin, Mohamed Ali Nurr,
Dheere Haaju Dheere, Ali Hassan Mohamed (Verduro), Haaji Mohamed Hussein Haa-
mud, Mohamed Faarah Hilowle (Farinaajo), Khaliif Huudoow Mahalin, Mohamed Hirsi
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Nuur (Sayiddin), Osman Geedi Raage, Mohamed Osman Baarbe, Daaji Osman (Dheg-
awayne), Mohamed Abdillaahi Faarah (Hayeesi).
9. For the humiliating nature of Italian rule, see Robert Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).
10. The Italian doctor was connected to the authorities. Earlier, he used to be the under-
ground link to Italian supporters during the British Administration. Money was sent
from Mogadishu via the postal service to the doctor who then distributed it to the client
Somalis. Abdirazak suspected the regularity of the money-containing parcel and so he
opened it one day to find large quantities of cash. He informed SYL headquarters and
passed on the money to Mogadishu for Party use. The practice ceased from then on.
11. Established in 1950, the Territorial Council was a 35-member advisory group, whose
membership consisted of representatives of existing political parties, elders from various
regions chosen by the Administration, and Italian, Arab, and Indo-Pakistani communi-
ties. The SYL was sufficiently satisfied with the shift in policy that it named one of
Mogadishu’s neighborhoods after Anzilotti.
12. Alphonso A. Castagno, Jr., Somalia (New York: Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, 1959).
13. All Party elections were through secret ballot.
14. The paradox is that the creation of a Somali government and a slow but measurable
improvement in service provisions generated divisions between those who benefited
from such service and direct employment and others who felt personally left out. Herein
lies one of the early sources of naked instrumentalist attitudes toward the state, a pos-
ture that enervated the development of a generalized consciousness of national interest.
15. Haji Mohamed was a good nationalist who did not understand how the political
party system worked. Consequently, he acted as if there was no contradiction between
his severe berating of the government whose party he himself backed.
16. The first group of Southern Somali college graduates returned to the country in 1959.
Among them were Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, Ahmed Elmi Dualeh (a medical doctor),
and Gabyo, who studied law and become the constitutional minister.
17. The unified national parliament consisted of 123 members, of which 33 were from the
North. There is no evidence that Northerners ever questioned the distribution of parlia-
mentary seats between the two regions.
18. He was a fairly literate and somewhat cautious man.
19. The level of education among Northern and Southern MPs was about the same. An
advantage that some Southerners had was their ability to speak both official languages.
In contrast, Northern civil servants were significantly more competent than those in the
South.
20. Michael Mariano was appointed as head of the Commission after he left Parliament
in 1964.
21. A former senior civil servant from the North heading a national ministry admitted
that they urged their Northern colleagues in Hargeisa to work against the constitutional
referendum. This individual told us that the cabinet, particularly all the senior Southern-
ers, including the Prime Minister, had full confidence in Northern senior civil servants.
Moreover, the PM and other senior ministers had special consultations with Northern
Director-Generals when it came to matters of integration. Our source could not explain
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what exactly motivated them to work against the Constitution given that Northerners
had a lot more than their share of leading civil service positions!
22. John Drysdale restated his praise for the leadership of Abdirazak as “the best Prime
Minister Somalia ever had.” This was noted in a postcard sent to Abdirazak in 1992 (in
our possession).
23. It seemed that Mohamed Ibrahim Egal’s recent behavior in the North was still fresh
in the PM’s mind, overshadowing his opposition to the Constitution. Two ministers,
Egal and Sheikh Ali Jimaaleh, were on a visit to the North to speak with the public. They
prolonged their visit. When a presidential visit to the North approached, the PM ordered
the two ministers and their delegations to return to Mogadishu to avoid transport prob-
lems, given that the only available plane for the president had very limited capacity to
accommodate both delegations. The two ministers requested that they be allowed to stay
in the North during the President’s visit, but the PM insisted on their return to
Mogadishu. This created strong resentment — both ministers felt belittled in the eyes of
their respective regions and quickly resigned. Hitherto, Sheikh Ali Jimaaleh was a firm
supporter of the regime, but immediately moved to the other extreme. The President’s
visit was a success, affirming the general emotions surrounding the evolving sense of
nationhood. Abdirazak worked to contain the political fallout precipitated by the resig-
nations, while it took the PM some time to appoint replacements. Yusuf Ismail Samater
took the place of Egal, and Basbaas became the Minister of Commerce.
24. Juujeh was an eloquent Somali speaker, but had little lived experience in the northern
two-thirds of the country. He was from Baydhabo and settled in Mogadishu very early
in his life and knew little about other regions. But he was a quick learner and had to
move fast to understand regional political cultures to effectively manage the ministry.
Internal politics were further exacerbated by Ethiopia’s vigorous campaign to destabilize
the young republic. The Ethiopian authorities spent substantial resources and focused
attention on the North. This was a difficult time for any serious politician. One of the
daunting problems was how numerous politicians disguised their personal interest as
regional and “clan” interests. There were no clear tactics to counteract this as the public
was illiterate and mass media was poorly developed. The low skill and educational level
of many cabinet members who could not convincingly articulate the nation’s common
agenda compounded this. One example of the difficulty the regime faced with the public
and with sectarian-oriented regional politicians is illustrated by the case of the town of
Burao. Abdirazak, as Minister of Interior, honored a longstanding request of the elders
of Burao to designate it as a new regional capital for eastern areas of the North. Although
the Minister recognized that the country could not afford more administrative centers,
he was concerned that any reluctance on his part would be misconstrued as a Southern
leader’s unwillingness to give power to Northerners. But another equally plausible inter-
pretation circulated when Burao’s request was approved that saw the creation of the
new region as a Southern ploy to create a problem within the Isaaq kin. Further, when a
native son was appointed as its first governor, segments of the Burao population who
were not immediately related to the new governor petitioned the Minister. Abdirazak
told the petitioners that the appointee was the most qualified person for the office and
urged them to give him a chance. He added that they should directly communicate with
him if the governor did not carry out his duties fairly.
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25. The Minister pointed out to his Southern colleagues that he had several nephews
who would not be able to take the examination, as they did not study English.
26. A further example of corruption involved the competition for a new telephone sys-
tem in Mogadishu. An additional source of corruption was family pressure. Abdirazak
claims that he does not remember giving a job to a single member of his own family.
27. See President Aden’s diaries, 1961–64.
28. The electoral laws of the North and South were integrated into a single national code,
developed after Abdirazak left Interior. Despite some irregularities in two locations dur-
ing the constitutional referendum, there was no concern with the openness and fairness
of the forthcoming election. While some members left SYL and Mohamed Ibrahim Egal
and Sheikh Ali Jimaaleh began to campaign under the SNL banner, none of them raised
any questions about the process. The Interior Ministry and the national police force man-
aged the election.
29. A member of the cabinet originally coined this phrase.
30. It was also rumored that Abdirazak’s disloyalty to the PM was manifested in one of
the occasions when he was acting PM. He decided to act against the corrupt parastatal,
which had a monopoly on incense. He claims that his intentions and those of other min-
isters were to relieve the PM from dealing with this agency, given that some of his con-
stituencies were involved. This was construed as calculated mischief to undermine the
Prime Minister.
31. This is the closest President Osman came to publicly explaining why he chose Abdi-
razak rather than Abdirashid: “I have faith that Abdirazak Haji Hussein is capable of
attempting to solve some of the grave problems that have been worrying me for some
time, and that are essentially internal.” Africa Report, November 1964, p. 6. According to
Africa Report, “The SYL Central Committee and parliamentary group had passed a unan-
imous resolution supporting the incumbent, Dr. Sharmarke, for the Premiership. But
President Osman was convinced, apparently, that the country needed a change . . .Abdi-
razak’s character as a tough minded, fair and enlightened leader was noted by many.
His friends say he is firm, but fair. His enemies say that he has the makings of a tyrant.
Nobody disputes his courage, nor the drive to work 18 hours a day, to the detriment of
his health even after a serious operation at Walter Reed Hospital in Washington, D.C.”
32. Upper Jubba had one of the largest numbers of parliamentary seats.
33. “[The] first cabinet caused consternation among the old guard, and excitement
among young intellectuals. By Somali standards, it is highly unorthodox because the
members were chosen without giving due weight to tribal and geographic balance.
There was an effort to stress ability and education as criteria for holding office. Five min-
isters were from the north as against two northerners in the outgoing Sharmarke cabinet
. . . Prime Minister Abdirazak also broke all precedents by requiring cabinet members to
make a formal declaration of personal property and business holdings.” Africa Report,
November 1964, p. 6.
34. Dhuhul’s Dalka depended on state printing since there were no other printers in the
country. On several occasions, Dhuhul did not have sufficient funds to pay for printing
but the Government allowed him to do so at no cost, despite his unflinching criticism.
35. Africa Report, November 1964.
Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar
63
36. Dalka, the independent weekly, took note of some of the political ground the Prime
Minister was breaking. “The other important political development . . . has been the dis-
missal of the Minister of Industry and Commerce, the Minister of Agriculture and the
Under-Secretary of Agriculture . . . the dismissals were due to charges of corruption. This
is an epoch-making development. No longer will the appointment to a ministerial post
mean a license to rob. . . . Another important political fact is that the dismissal of a minis-
ter because he has been charged with corrupt practices is a development we could not
possibly have expected from any of our prime ministers. The present Prime Minister has
his faults—certainly many of them. But it would be neither fair nor honourable to deny
him the support and praise he deserves for re-establishing the principle that even minis-
ters cannot afford to be caught in compromising situations, involving the misuse of pub-
lic funds or the power of office.. .A third important aspect—perhaps the most important
— is that the Attorney General’s office has applied to the National Assembly for autho-
rization to institute criminal proceedings against the two ministers and the Under-Secre-
tary. Such a request must be moved in the assembly by a fifth of its membership and
must be approved by a two-thirds majority in a secret ballot. The requests for the autho-
rization to prosecute in respect of at least the ex-Minister of Industry and Commerce is
believed to have been submitted to the President of the National Assembly some months
ago. The one in respect of the Minister of Agriculture was apparently submitted at about
the time of or after his dismissal . . . The general belief in informed circles is that the
requests for authorization were kept from examination in the last session by the Presi-
dent of the National Assembly.” Dalka, Vol. I, no. 8 (1966): 10.
37. Ibid.
38. The Constitution of the Somali Republic, p. 22.
39. Ali Siad Araleh interview, Nairobi, July 2001.
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